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Arranger Fees in Syndicated Loans-A
Duty to Account to Participant Banks?
Gavin R. Skene*
Abstract
Syndicated loans, while often considered arm's length commercial
transactions, may create a fiduciary relationship between the arranger
and the participant banks.
A court's possible invocation of a fiduciary relationship may not
only give rise to potential adverse legal and commercial issues for an
arranger, but may also have wider adverse implications for the efficient
operation of the loan syndication markets themselves. For example, an
arranger considered to be the fiduciary of the participant banks under a
syndicated loan may be required to account to the participant banks for
any arranger fees it receives from the borrower or to make a full
disclosure to the participant banks of all information known to the
arranger as to the affairs of the borrower.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate whether or not a common
law court is likely to, first, conclude that an arranger is a fiduciary of the
participant banks under a syndicated loan and, second, require the
arranger to disgorge and account for any arranger fees it receives from
the borrower in favor of the participant banks under a syndicated loan.
Finally, this article examines whether commercial techniques are
available to an arranger to mitigate legal consequences in respect of
arranger fees that may flow from a court's characterization of the
arranger as a fiduciary of the participant banks under a syndicated loan.

* B.Comm (Finance), LL.B (Hons) (Deakin), LL.M (Melb), Barrister and Solicitor
of the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia and the Supreme
Court of New South Wales, Australia. The author is a solicitor in the Sydney office of
Mallesons Stephen Jaques where he specializes in project and debt finance. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by
Mallesons Stephen Jaques.
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Introduction

The relationship between international and domestic loan
syndication markets, banks, and financial institutions is symbiotic.
While banks and financial institutions are required to provide the size
and volume of funding commitments necessary to sustain the efficient
operation of loan syndication markets,1 they are equally reliant upon the
fees they generate as a result of their participation in these markets to
ensure their own commercial viability.2
Syndicated loans, while often considered arm's length commercial
transactions, may create a fiduciary relationship between the arranger
and the participant banks.
A court's possible invocation of a fiduciary relationship may not
only give rise to potential adverse legal and commercial issues for an
arranger, but may also have wider adverse implications for the efficient
operation of the loan syndication markets themselves. For example, an
arranger considered to be the fiduciary of the participant banks under a
syndicated loan may be required to account to the participant banks for
any arranger fees it receives from the borrower or to make a full
disclosure to the participant banks of all information known to the
arranger as to the affairs of the borrower.3
Naturally, an arranger would view the mere possibility that it is
legally obligated to pay any arranger fees it receives from the borrower
1. For example, as a representation of the Asia Pacific loan syndications market, as
of April 15, 2005, the top five lead arrangers for the year to date were as follows:
(1) Mizuho Financial Group Inc, US $41,295.43 million, 261 participations;
(2) Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp, US $31,050.44 million, 336 participations;
(3) Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group Inc, US $21,683.70 million, 173 participations;
(4) Citigroup Inc, US $12,804.11 million, 89 participations; and (5) HSBC, US $6,833.92
million, 97 participations. Asia-Pacific Loan Market Association, Syndicated Loans:
ArrangerLeague Table, Asia Pacific (2005), at http://www.aplma.com (last visited May
30, 2005).
2. For example, in 1997, it was reported that Australian arrangers were paid more
than $750 million in fees. See Press Release, AXISS Australia, Asia-Pacific Loan
Market Association (June 2, 1999), availableat http://www.axiss.com.au/contentmedia/
releases/1999-06-02.asp (last visited May 30, 2005). However, as a result of aggressive
syndicated loan market conditions, some commentators contend that the quantum of
arranger fees may be adversely affected by current downward trend in relation to the
pricing of investment grade loans. For example, Mr. Atiq Ur Rehman, head of European
and Asian loans at Citigroup, commented that "[iut is very much a borrower's market at
the moment. Loan pricing fell in the US, Europe and Asia last year and has the potential
to reduce further." See Borrowers are Still in the Driving Seat of Loan Pricing, THE
BANKER, Feb. 3, 2004, at 49, availableat http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/
aid/1167/Borrowers are still in the driving-seat ofjoan-pricing.html
(last visited
May 30, 2005).
3. These equitable duties are derived from the central concept of "loyalty" owed by
a person to his or her beneficiary. See generally G. DAL PONT & D. CHALMERS, EQUITY
AND TRUSTS rN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 4.05-4.25 (3d ed. 2004).

2005]

ARRANGER FEES IN SYNDICATED LOANS

to the participant banks under a syndicated loan as nothing short of
disastrous.
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, this article evaluates
whether a common law court is likely to conclude that an arranger is a
fiduciary of the participant banks under a syndicated loan. Second, this
article considers whether an arranger, as a fiduciary of the participant
banks, must disgorge and account for any arranger fees it receives from
the borrower in favor of the participant banks. Finally, this article
examines whether commercial techniques are available to the arranger to,
first, reduce the possibility that a common law court will hold that an
arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks and, second, mitigate an
arranger's legal obligation to account for any arranger fees in favor of the
participant banks generally.
Given that it is impractical to undertake a sufficiently detailed
examination of each relevant common law jurisdiction, this article
conducts, by way of illustrative example, an assessment of the stated
purpose with respect to the laws of Australia because these laws are
largely representative of the laws of other common law jurisdictions.
II.

The Mechanics of a Syndicated Loan

Given that the focus of this article is largely to evaluate the possible
fiduciary relationship that may exist between an arranger and participant
banks under a syndicated loan, it is useful to first briefly examine the
nature and mechanics of a syndicated loan and, second, to consider the
role undertaken by an arranger of a syndicated loan.
A.

Syndicated Loans-A Quick Primer

Multi-lender financings, such as syndicated loans, provide a
preferred mechanism for financial institutions to loan large amounts of
money to borrowers. Multi-lender fmancings allow financial institutions
to, among other things, efficiently allocate risk, manage borrower
relationships and ensure their ongoing compliance with capital adequacy
standards.4
Generally, there are two types of multi-lender financings,
syndicated loans and syndicated participations. A syndicated loan6 is an
4. See MALLESONS STEPHEN JAQUES, AUSTRALIAN FINANCE LAW 219-20 (5th ed.
2003), for a discussion of the advantages lenders enjoy by participating in multi-lender
financings.
5. K. DeMarte, Foreign Lead Bank Liability: Inter-creditorLiability Arising Under
Information Memoranda and its Consequences for Australian Banks in International
Loan Syndications, 14 J. BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAc. 5, 6 (2003). However, arguably
"club financings" may constitute a third type of multi-lender financing whereby several
lenders act in parallel to each other and lend to the borrower on the same terms. See
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agreement by a number of financial institutions to severally lend money
or provide other financial facilities 7 to a borrower. 8 By contrast, a
syndicated participation is one or more agreements, each a "participation
agreement," entered into by a lead financial institution, who has already
agreed to lend money or provide other financial facilities to a borrower,
and another financial institution, known as a "participant," under which
the lead financial institution sells a part or all of the loan to the
participant. 9
The primary distinction between a syndicated loan and a syndicated
participation is that a syndicated loan is documented within one loan
agreement to which the borrower and all other participant banks are a
party, whereas a syndicated participation is only documented in a
participation agreement between the lead financial institution and the
participant.
Accordingly, under a syndicated participation, no privity of contract
exists between the participant and the borrower. 10 For instance, under a
syndicated participation, the loan documentation has already been agreed
to between the borrower and lead financial institution prior to any sale of
an interest in the loan to the participant. Hence the participant remains
wholly reliant upon the lead financial institution pursuant to the terms of
its participation agreement, in order to protect and advance its interests in
respect to the syndicated participation." Conversely, under a syndicated
loan, privity of contract exists between the borrower and each participant
bank. However, it remains an important feature of a syndicated loan that
the liability of each participant bank be "several," and not "joint and
several," so as to ensure that each participant bank is not liable to the
borrower for the obligations of other participant banks under the loan
documentation, such as for funding commitments.
supra note 4, at 244.
6. The term "syndicated loan" is used interchangeably with the term "syndicated
facility."
7. Other financial facilities include bill facilities or letters of credit, neither of
which is a "loan" per se. See, e.g., K.D. Morris & Sons Pty Ltd. v. Bank of Queensl. Ltd.
(1980) 146 C.L.R. 165.
MALLESONS,

8. J. O'Sullivan, The Role of Managers and Agents in Syndicated Loans, 3 J.
BANKING & FIN. L. & PRAc. 162, 163 (1992). See also MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 221.
9. A loan participation can be conducted on a "flinded" or "risk" basis. M. Jones,
Bankers Beware: The Risk of Syndicated Credits, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 169, 172 (1999).
10. The common law privity of contract doctrine provides that only a party to a
contract may sue under it or be subject to the obligations created by it. See, e.g., Coulls
v. Bagot's Ex' and Tr. Co. Ltd. (1967) 119 C.L.R. 460. While Australia has no
comparative legislation, the strict doctrine of privity of contract is capable of
modification in the United Kingdom under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act,
1999 (U.K.).
11. See generally ASSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE 10.02[1]
(Howard Ruda ed., 1994).
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Given that a syndicated participation is defined by the four corners
of the participation agreement between the lead financial institution and a
participant without the involvement of an arranger or agent bank, this
article concerns syndicated loans and the possible rights and obligations
that flow between an arranger and the participant banks thereunder.
Therefore, by way of background, Mallesons Stephen Jaques
suggests that the syndication process1 2 for a syndicated loan generally
consists of six stages, as set out below.
1. The intending borrower approaches one or more banks to
negotiate the key terms of the loan facility. Depending
upon the bargaining position of the borrower, a borrower
may document the indicative terms of the loan in a "term
sheet" prior to approaching prospective arranger banks.
Negotiation or modification of the key terms by the
arranger must be balanced against the expectations of the
borrower and the acceptability of the proposed terms in the
loan syndications marketplace. A failure by the arranger to
balance these competing interests may result in it either not
being appointed as arranger for the syndicated loan or later
being unable to obtain funding commitments from
prospective participant banks.
2. Upon agreement of the key terms of the loan facility, the
borrower appoints the bank as "arranger," under which the
bank is given a mandate to arrange the loan facility on
behalf of the borrower. The arranger may also agree to
underwrite a part or all of the funding commitments of the
loan facility should it be unable to obtain sufficient
commitments from participants in the loan syndications
market.
3. The arranger, on behalf of the borrower, commences the
process of marketing the loan facility to prospective
participant banks. As part of the marketing process, the
arranger, in conjunction with the borrower, customarily
prepares an "information memorandum," which furnishes
key information about the borrower relevant to a
prospective participant bank, including its business,
financial position and future prospects, and distributes both
the information memorandum and term sheet to the
prospective participant banks. The marketing process may
12. MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 221-22. But see O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 163.
O'Sullivan asserts that the syndication process may be more meaningfully delineated as
comprising both "pre-contract" and "post-contract" stages. Id.
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also include an information "road-show" where key officers
of the borrower conduct a presentation with respect to the
material set out in the information memorandum and the
general attractiveness of a bank's participation in the
syndicated loan.
4. Interested participant banks agree to the terms of the term
sheet and thus agree to provide funding commitments to the
borrower subject to approval of the loan documentation. It
is customary that a first draft of the loan documentation will
be distributed for comment by the participant banks upon
their formal commitment to fund the syndicated loan.
5. Participant banks provide comments on and negotiate the
loan documentation. It is customary that the arranger acts
as a conduit between the borrower and the participant bank
for the purpose of facilitating the negotiation of the loan
documentation. In practice, the participant banks, including
the arranger, who is also usually a participant bank in its
own right, collectively negotiate the loan documentation
with the borrower, rather than each participant bank
negotiating separately.
To facilitate this process, the
participant banks usually agree to appoint the same legal
counsel to represent all the interests of the participant banks
in the syndicate. The extent and depth of negotiation is
largely determinative upon the arranger's success in
balancing the borrower's expectations against the market
acceptability of the loan facility and reflecting the same in
13
the term sheet.
6. Once collective agreement exists as to the terms of the loan
documentation, the loan documentation will be signed and
the funding commitments by the participant banks
formalized. Importantly, contemporaneous with the signing
of the loan documentation, the arranger's role will
automatically terminate and the role of agent bank will
commence. A participant bank, quite often the arranger or a
related corporate body, is appointed as agent bank under the
loan documentation whose principal function is to
administer the syndicated loan on behalf of the participant
banks. 14

13. See supra stage 1 of the syndication process for a discussion of this point.
14. See MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 228, for a discussion of the role of an agent
bank and its relationship with other parties under a syndicated loan.
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The Role of an Arrangerunder a Syndicated Loan

Fundamental to the operation of a syndicated loan are the roles of
arranger and agent bank. Unlike a bilateral loan between a borrower and
lender inter se, a syndicated loan comprises an array of various parties,
each of whom have different and often competing interests.
A participant bank may severally undertake the roles of arranger,
agent bank, security agent and lender under a syndicated loan. In
practice, it is common that a participant bank or one of its related
corporate bodies will undertake both roles of arranger and agent bank.
Given the purpose of this article, it is important to have a brief
understanding of the nature and scope of the role of arranger because this
will necessarily affect the scope of rights and obligations owed by the
arranger to the borrower and the participant banks under a syndicated
loan.
1.

Functions of an Arranger

As considered earlier,15 a syndicated loan transaction commences
upon the initial negotiation between the borrower and a bank, later to be
appointed as arranger, in respect to the key terms of the syndicated loan
The role of arranger will automatically terminate
facility.
contemporaneously with the signing of the loan documentation.
the arranger's primary
Mallesons Stephen Jaques considers
16
functions under a syndicated loan include:
a) co-ordination of the loan facility and arrangement of the
syndication, including obtaining funding commitments from
prospective participant banks;
b) assisting the borrower with the preparation of the
information memorandum, including limited due diligence
and financial modeling of relevant data; and
c) documentation, including preparation of the term sheet and
the appointment of and liaising with the participant bank
syndicate's legal counsel.
Depending upon the quantum of the funding commitments sought
under a syndicated loan, it is common for two or more banks to be given
a mandate by the borrower to arranger the loan. In practice, multiple
arrangers use various titles to designate their seniority and role under the
syndicated loan and for the purpose of establishing prestige in the loan
While the exact title ascribed to an
syndication marketplace. 17
15.
16.

See supra Part II(A).
MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 223.

17.

The seniority of a bank in a syndicated loan is usually determined by the
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"arranger" usually depends upon the financial institution involved and
the relevant syndications market, common titles may include "lead
arranger," "lead arranger and underwriter," "joint mandated lead
arranger," "co-arranger" or any other combination thereof.
2.

Remuneration of an Arranger

Participant banks that undertake the role of arranger under a
syndicated loan are remunerated by the borrower by way of payment of
"arranger fees." Calculation of arranger fees may be referable to the
underlying funding commitment of that participant bank in the
syndicated loan, such as a specified number of basis points payable by
reference to the drawn commitment under the loan facility, or it may be a
fixed amount.
The legal obligation of the borrower to pay arranger fees may arise:
a) upon acceptance by the arranger of the borrower's mandate
to arrange the loan facility, where the relevant mandate
letter or term sheet prepared by the borrower:
(i)
expressly provides for the quantum or method of
calculation of arranger fees; or
(ii)
only provides a primary obligation to pay arranger
fees, leaving the quantum or method of calculation
of the fee to be agreed between the borrower and
arranger in a separate "side" or "fee" letter; or
b) after the acceptance by the arranger of the borrower's
mandate to arrange the loan facility, where the borrower
and the arranger enter into a separate "side" or "fee" letter
in relation to the quantum or method of calculation of
arranger fees that is not referable to the relevant mandate
letter or term sheet prepared by the borrower.
The payment of arranger fees by the borrower, at the request of the
arranger, by way of a "side" or "fee" letter is becoming an increasingly
common theme of industry practice. The rationale of this practice is a
product of the highly competitive nature of the loan syndication markets
and is used to deny the participant banks knowledge of the specific
quantum of arranger fees paid to the arranger under the syndicated loan.
To achieve this purpose, the specific terms of the relevant mandate letter
or term sheet prepared by the borrower are left silent or incorporate by
reference the "side" or "fee" letter on the understanding that the arranger
will document payment of arranger fees at a later date. Comfort of full
payment of the arranger fees is afforded to the arranger through the
quantum of that bank's funding commitment.
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designation of the "side" or "fee" letter as a "transaction" or "finance"
document under the loan facility, thereby granting the arranger the
benefit of the covenants under the loan agreement and any security
provided by the borrower under the syndicated loan in the event of nonpayment.
3.

Potential Legal Risks for an Arranger under a Syndicated Loan

The complex relationships formed between the arranger, the
borrower and the participant banks under a syndicated loan exposes the
arranger to considerable legal risk. The nature of the role assumed by the
arranger under these relationships is often competing and adverse to the
interests of each other party, including the arranger's own self interests,
under the syndicated loan.
This position is especially true where an arranger has also been
appointed as agent bank under a syndicated loan because its duties and
obligations will "shift" primarily from the borrower and possibly the
participant banks to just the participant banks when one role ceases and
the other commences. Accordingly, there may be circumstances where it
is unclear as to whom the arranger owes certain duties, the length of time
that the duties are owed, or whether such duties have merged. 18
Broadly, an arranger's involvement in a syndicated loan will have
the potential to expose it to the following legal risks:' 9
a) advising the borrower in relation to the syndications market,
especially as to the marketability of the key terms of the
loan facility;
b) accepting arranger fees from the borrower in its own right,
including any failure to hold on account such fees in favour
of the participant banks;
c) assisting the borrower with the preparation of the
information memorandum, including conducting limited
due diligence on the borrower. This may be especially
problematic where the arranger has a prior or existing
commercial banking relationship with the borrower;
18. While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the duties and obligations
of an agent bank under a syndicated loan in detail, the mere designation of an agent bank
immediately raises questions of agency and the prima facie existence of a fiduciary
relationship between the agent bank and participant banks. For example, in Chem. Bank
v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 20 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 1994), the court held that as a general
principle, the agent bank, by virtue of its designation as the agent bank, owed a fiduciary
duty to the participant banks. But see the comments of Gibbs CJ in Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v.
U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 71-72 (stating that not every agent was a
fiduciary of its principal).
19. MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 224.
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d) negotiating the terms of the loan facility on behalf of the
borrower with the participant banks, including ensuring that
the loan documentation is materially consistent to that of
the term sheet as agreed between, among others, the
borrower and arranger; and
e) acting as a participant bank in the syndicated loan in its own
right.
While it is evident that an arranger may be exposed to a wide array
of legal risks due to its role as an arranger of a syndicated loan,
particularly with regard to its involvement in the preparation of the
information memorandum,2 ° this article concerns the possible invocation
of fiduciary status between an arranger and the participant banks and, in
the event that such relationship exists, the extent to which the arranger
must account and disgorge any arranger fees received from the borrower
in favor of the participant banks.
III.

21
The Arranger as a Fiduciary of Participant Banks

Requiring an arranger to account for any arranger fees it receives
from a borrower under a syndicated loan is largely predicated upon a
determination that an arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks.22
Therefore, this part first overviews the trend of common law courts
to intervene in modem day commercial transactions and impose a
fiduciary relationship in a commercial environment, second, this part
examines in detail the merits of the four judicial approaches to arranger
and participant bank fiduciary theory and, finally, provides this author's
observations on which academic view should be preferred by Australian
courts when confronted with the question of determining whether an
arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks under a syndicated loan,
having regard to any current judicial trends.
A.

The Imposition of a FiduciaryRelationship in a Commercial
Environment

During the late twentieth century, common law courts increasingly
reformulated and applied traditional private law principles to modem day
commerce. 3 While courts perhaps once drew sharp distinctions between
20. See, e.g., Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd. (Unreported,
Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, July 26, 1993).
21. This part is based substantially upon a prior work of the author; G. Skene,
Syndicated Loans: Arrangerand ParticipantBank Fiduciary Theory, 6 J. INT'L BANK. L.
& REG. 269 (2005).
22. But see infra Part IV(B), in relation to the possible application of Australian
secret commissions legislation.
23. See, e.g., Breen v. Williams, (1994) 35 N.S.W.L.R. 52 (Meagher J criticizes the
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the contractual interests of one party against the contractual interests of
another, jurisprudential overtones of fairness, morality and altruism have
aided in the normalization of the rules of private law as applied by these
24

courts.

The wider acceptance by common law courts of the jurisprudential
canon of "anti-formalism ' 25 fostered a dramatic evolution to the body of
law known as "equity., 26 By contrast to strict doctrines of private law,
justice in an equitable jurisdiction can be thought more to inhere in
outcomes reached than in any principle for social action that decisions
27
may imply.

The principles of equity are incapable of precise definition and will,
of course, vary depending upon the social and religious context in which
they are applied. A person may be said to have acted equitably if they
were to act fairly and justly, thus having undertaken conduct that is
balanced and proportionate in the circumstances. Conversely, a person
may be said to have acted inequitably if they were to have undertaken
conduct that was not balanced and proportionate in the circumstances
and where such conduct could be described as being either immoral or
unethical.28
The body of equitable canons is fast growing, and its application to
modem day commerce is far reaching. Writing extra-curially, Sir
Anthony Mason remarked that distinctive concepts, doctrines, principles
and remedies developed by the old Courts of Chancery have "extended
beyond old boundaries into new territory where no Lord Chancellor's
foot has previously left its imprint.... Equitable doctrines and relief
have penetrated the citadels of business and commerce, long thought, at
least by common lawyers, to be immune from the intrusion of such
29

principles.,

The imposition of equity into a commercial environment is no less
evident than in the case of the "fiduciary relationship." A fiduciary
tendency of Canadian Courts to discover fiduciary obligations in situations where
traditional jurisprudence would have ordinarily denied them). See also T. Carlin,
Fiduciary Obligationsin Non-TraditionalSettings-An Update, 29 AUSTL. Bus. L. REV.

65 (2001).
24.

See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,

89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1713-17, 1776-77 (1976).
25. Id.
26. The word "equity" is derived from the Latin word "aequum" to mean physical
equality or evenness. See, e.g., J. HEYDON et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUITY AND
TRUSTS (4th ed. 1993).
27.

28.
29.

J. GLOVER, COMMERCIAL EQUITY: FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 1.1 (1995).
See, e.g., SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 672-73 (J. Parker ed., 9th ed. 1937).

A. Mason, The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary

Common Law World, 110 L. Q. REV. 238, 238 (1994). See also GLOVER, supra note 27,
at 1.3.
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relationship exists in certain types of relationships that exhibit particular
pre-existing "fiduciary" qualities, such as recognized relationships of
trust and confidence, 30 relationships of influence 31 and relationships

concerning confidential information.3 2 While there is no comprehensive
definition of what mode of relationship constitutes a fiduciary
relationship, an influential description of fiduciary status was provided
by the High Court of Australia in HospitalProducts Ltd. v. United States
Surgical Corp.33 (hereinafter "HospitalProducts"):
The critical feature of [accepted fiduciary relationships] is that the
fiduciary undertakes or agrees to act for or on behalf of or in the
interests of another person in the exercise of a power or discretion
which will affect the interests of that other person in a legal or
practical sense. The relationship between the parties is therefore one
which gives the fiduciary special opportunity to exercise the power or
discretion to the detriment of that other person who is accordingly
vulnerable to abuse by the fiduciary of his position. 34
Consistent with the dichotomy espoused by Mason J in Hospital
Products, the Supreme Court of Canada in LAC Minerals Ltd. v.
InternationalCorona Resources Ltd.35 considered that:
[r]elationships in which fiduciary obligations have been imposed
seem to possess three general characteristics: (a) the fiduciary has
scope for the exercise of some discretion or power; (b) the fiduciary

can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect the
beneficiary's legal or practical interests; and (c) the beneficiary is
peculiarly vulnerable36 to, or at the mercy of, the fiduciary holding the
discretion or power.

The ability of an injured party to establish a fiduciary relationship in
a commercial environment is extremely advantageous. Dal Pont and
Chalmers consider that it may be desirable for an injured party to raise a
cause of action based on a breach of duties owed under a fiduciary
relationship because:
30. Examples include, relationships between partners, agent and principal, trustee

and beneficiary, company and director, employer and employee, and solicitor and client.
See Hosp. Prods. Ltd.v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 96.

31. Examples of "relationships of influence" include, relationships between parent
and child, priest and parishioner, and solicitor and client. See e.g., W. Winder, Undue
Influence and Coercion, 3 MELB. U. L. REV. 97, 100 (1939).
32. Examples include, relationships where confidential information may be received
such as between employer and employee or manufacture and inventor. See, e.g.,
GLOVER, supra note 27, at 1.15.
33. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 156 C.L.R. 41.
34. Id. at 96.

35. LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Res. Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, 596.
36. Id.
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a) the injured party may have a weak or no cause of action at
common law in tort or contract;
b) establishing a breach of an equitable duty allows the
plaintiff to seek equitable remedies, including proprietary
relief, and
c) equitable relief may be available in circumstances where
other available common law relief may be excluded, such as
under limitation of actions legislation.37
Clearly, an injured party's successful characterization of a commercial
relationship as fiduciary is extremely beneficial because it affords the
injured party an alternative equitable cause of action and equitable relief
against the offending party. Given the superiority of equitable relief,
such equitable compensation3 8 or the creation of an equitable trust over
profits, 39 vis--vis common law relief, such as damages, courts should be
cautious about characterizing any commercial relationship as fiduciary.4 °
B. Arrangerand ParticipantBank FiduciaryTheory
Modem courts of common law jurisdictions have wrangled
generally with the expansion of the law of equity into the province of
commerce. 41 The inherent incompatibility between equity, which
promotes fairness and justice on the one hand, and commerce, which
protects self-advancement and self-promotion on the other, can be clearly
illustrated in the case of the invocation by a court of a fiduciary
relationship between an arranger and the participant banks under a
syndicated loan.
It is generally accepted that the relationship between an arranger
and a participant bank falls outside the boundaries of the established
fiduciary relationship categories.4 2 Therefore, an Australian court must
have regard to the relevant jurisprudence relating to the intrusion of the
fiduciary relationship into commercial transactions when considering
whether or not the character of the relationship between an arranger and
participant bank is one that exhibits the necessary characteristics present
in a fiduciary relationship.43

DAL PONT & CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 4.05.
38. See, e.g., Nocton v. Lord Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 946. See also Davidson,
The EquitableRemedy of Compensation, 13 MELB. U. REV. 349 (1982).
39. See, e.g., Boardman v. Phipps [1965] Ch 992, ajf'd [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
40. See, e.g., Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R 41, 149.
41. See supra Part Ill(A).
42. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text for established relationships
considered by courts to be primafacie fiduciary in character.
43. See, e.g., Hosp. Prods.Ltd., 156 C.L.R. 41. See also DAL PONT & CHALMERS,
supra note 3, at 4.200.
37.
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Given the size and volume of syndicated loans made in the global
marketplace each year," it is surprising that there is little authoritative
case law in common law jurisdictions that examines the set of legal
relationships between the actors of a syndicated loan generally and the
legal rights and obligations that flow between an arranger and the
participant banks specifically.45 Therefore, in the absence of any
decisive common law judicial position, four academic schools of thought
have emerged in respect to the proper characterization of the relationship
between an arranger and the participant banks under a syndicated loan.
1.

"Arm's Length" Academic View

Dal Pont and Chalmers state, as a general proposition of Australian
law, that where parties to a commercial transaction have dealt with each
other at arm's length in circumstances where no special reliance or trust
has been placed by one party in the other, or where no special
vulnerability exists, there is no justification for a court to impose upon
one of the parties fiduciary duties in favor of the other.46
Commentators within the banking and finance industry have
supported this position and strenuously deny the proposition that an
arranger assumes fiduciary obligations in favor of participant banks
when performing its role as arranger of a syndicated loan. 47 For instance,
in a well known statement, Clarke and Farrar opine that:
Fiduciary obligations should not be imposed on the [arranger]. The
members of a syndicate are "buying" a product developed, marketed
and serviced by the [arranger]/agent.
While the members
undoubtedly rely on the reputation and experience of the [arranger],
the relationship is not fundamentally different from the relationship
between IBM and the purchaser of a large computer system.. . the
better view is that the syndication process represents a classic arm's
length transaction and, therefore, fiduciary obligations should not be
imposed on the [arranger]. 48

44. See, e.g., Asia-Pacific Loan Market Association, supra note 1, for an example of
the Asia Pacific syndicated loan marketplace.
45. The three leading common law cases that consider the role of arranger under a
syndicated loan include: Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, July 26, 1993); UBAF Ltd. v.
European Am. Banking Corp., 2 W.L.R. 508 (Q.B. 1984); Sumitomo Bank Ltd. v.
Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 487 (1997).
46. DAL PONT & CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 4.200.
47. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 162. See also L. Clarke & S. Farrar Rights
and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated Loans to Government
Borrowers, 1 U. ILL .L. REV. 229 (1982).
48. Clarke & Farrar, supra note 47, at 234.
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Accordingly, the arm's length commercial party dichotomy is based on
the arranger and the participant banks being highly sophisticated, usually
receiving specialized financial and legal advice, and transacting with one
another pursuant to their own self interest and desire for commercial
gain. Moreover, pursuant to the arm's length academic view, the notion
of fiduciary status can be rebuked because an arranger and the participant
banks have access to materially the same quality of information prior to
entering into the syndicated loan, namely by conducting their own
independent due diligence of the borrower,49 thus disclaiming the
existence of any special disadvantage on the part of one party as a result
of any undue reliance on the part of another.5 °
The justification of a common law court to intervene in a prima
facie arm's length commercial relationship and superimpose fiduciary
duties over contractual ones must be convincing and paramount. In
Hospital Products, the most authoritative case in Australia with respect
to the extension of the fiduciary relationship to a commercial
environment, the High Court of Australia cautioned against the
construction of a fiduciary relationship in an arm's length commercial
transaction. Gibbs CJ, who wrote for the majority and with whom
Wilson and Dawson JJ concurred, stated that "the fact that the
arrangement between the parties was of a purely commercial kind and
that they dealt at arm's length and on an equal footing has consistently
been regarded by this Court as important, if not decisive, in indicating
that no fiduciary duty arose.",51 Moreover, Dawson J emphasized "[t]he
undesirability of extending fiduciary duties to commercial relationships
and the anomaly of imposing those duties where parties are at arm's
length from one another....
The views of the majority of the High Court of Australia in Hospital
Products have also been largely endorsed by other common law
jurisdictions. For example, in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v.
Council of the London Borough of Islington,53 the English House of
Lords cautioned against a "wholesale importation" of principles into
49. For example, a prospective borrower may provide participant banks with raw
financial data capable of being modeled by the participant banks according to their own
industry variables, forecasts and risk tolerances.
50. But see Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria,
McDonald J, July 26, 1993) (the Supreme Court of Victoria held that there was an
imbalance of information between the arranger and the participant banks because the
arranger failed to disclose certain pre-existing securities granted to it by the borrower).
See also Sumitomo Bank Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 487 (1997).
51. Hosp. Prods. Ltd v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 70. See also
Keith Henry & Co. Pty Ltd. v Stuart Walker & Co. Pty Ltd. (1958) 100 C.L.R. 342.
52. Hosp. Prods.Ltd., 156 C.L.R. at 149.
53. Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Council of the London Borough of
Islington, [1996] A.C. 669.
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commercial dealings which are "inconsistent with the certainty and speed
which are essential requirements for the orderly conduct of business
affairs. 54 In Bowkett v. Action Finance Ltd.,55 the High Court of New
Zealand stated that "equity must tread carefully when intervening in
commercial relationships. There is no room for such intervention on a
tender moralistic basis. The circumstances must be such as to call loudly
for equitable relief.., the circumstances must shock the conscious of the
56
Court.,
Furthermore, in LAC Minerals Ltd. v. InternationalCorona
Resources Ltd., the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found
that fiduciary obligations "must be reserved for situations that are truly in
need of the special protection that equity affords. 58
Therefore, while difficult to synthesize an exact principle, it is
submitted that an Australian court will be very reluctant to find the
existence of a fiduciary relationship in a commercial arrangement that
was entered into by parties on equal footing at arm's length to one
another, such as the primafacie relationship between an arranger and the
participant banks under a syndicated loan. 9
2.

"Fiduciary" Academic View

The "fiduciary" academic view considers that an arranger will, at all
relevant times, owe fiduciary duties to the participant banks under a
syndicated loan. Two bases support this view.
First, the fiduciary academic view finds primary support in the
English Court of Appeal's decision in UBAF Ltd. v. European American
Banking Corporation60 (hereinafter UBAF). In UBAF, the plaintiff, an
English bank, was invited by the defendant, a United States bank, to
participate in two loans that the defendant intended to make to two
companies that formed part of the same shipping group. The defendant
was also the intended agent bank under the syndicated loan. The
defendant provided the plaintiff with a term sheet that set out key
information about each intended loan, a business study of the shipping
group and a valuation of the two ships owned by the borrower
companies, which were intended to be given as security for the loans.
The information provided by the defendant represented, among other
things, that the loans were "attractive financing of two companies in a
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Bowkett v. Action Fin. Ltd. (1992) 1 N.Z.L.R 449.
Id. at 462.
LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Res. Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574.
Id. at 596.

59.

See

1985).
60.

ESSAYS IN EQUITY-FIDUCIARIES IN A COMMERCIAL CONTEXT

(P. Finn ed.,

UBAF Ltd. v. European Am. Banking Corp., 2 W.L.R. 508 (Q.B. 1984).
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sound and profitable group., 6 1 The plaintiff agreed to participate in the
loans in reliance upon these representations. Unfortunately, some time
thereafter, each borrower company defaulted under its respective loan.
The plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant for payments due in
connection with the loans alleging, among other things, deceit, negligent
misrepresentation and breach of section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation
Act, 1967 (U.K.).
In UBAF, the English Court of Appeal did not consider the
substantive merits of the plaintiffs causes of action. However, in an
interlocutory appeal against a decision to set aside ex juris service,
Ackner and Oliver LJJ said in obiter dicta:
The transaction into which the plaintiffs were invited to enter, and did
enter, was that of contributing to a syndicate loan where, as seems to
us, quite clearly the defendants were acting in a fiduciary capacity
for all the otherparticipants. It was the defendants who received the
plaintiffs' money and it was the defendants who arranged for and
held, on behalf of all of the participants, the collateral security for the
loan. If, therefore at any time whilst they were carrying out their
fiduciary duties that the security was, as the plaintiffs allege,
inadequate, it must, we think, clearly have been their duty to inform
the participants of that fact and their continued failure to do so would
a continuing breach of their fiduciary duty (emphasis
constitute
62
added).

The statements made by Ackner and Oliver LJJ in UBAF tend to indicate
that, at least from an English law perspective, an invitation made by an
arranger to a participant bank to participate in a syndicated loan may give
rise to a fiduciary relationship between the parties. However, this
position is far from settled, with many English legal commentators
suggesting that the comments made by their Lordships in UBAF do not
create a wider principle that would prima facie impose a fiduciary
relationship between an arranger and participant bank under a syndicated
63
loan.
Therefore, the extent to which the comments made by their
Lordships in UBAF are sufficiently authoritative so as to bind, or at least
to persuade an Australian court remains inconclusive and should be
moderated against the following:
a) the convention that the High Court of Australia and State
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., R. Davies & D. Halliday, Risks and Responsibilities of the Agent Bank
and the Arranging Bank in Syndicated CreditFacilities, 5 J. INT'L BANKING L. 182, 183
(1997); G. Bhattacharyya, The Duties and Liabilities of Lead Managers in Syndicated
Loans, 16 CoMPANY LAW. 261 (1995).
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and Territory Supreme Courts acquiesce to decisions of the
English Court
of Appeal is no longer considered good law
64
in Australia;
b) the statements made by Ackner and Oliver LJJ were clearly
obiter dicta and made in the context of an interlocutory
appeal relating to the reinstatement of an order for exjuris
service and not otherwise in respect of a deliberate
determination as to whether or not a fiduciary relationship
existed between the plaintiff and defendant. Therefore, the
context in which such statements were rendered by the
Court should necessarily affect their persuasiveness;
c) the decision in UBAF could be distinguished on the facts
surrounding the refinancing of the defendant's pre-existing
loans made to each borrower company, which had the effect
of reducing the defendant's total exposure under the
financing package to the shipping group. Therefore, their
Lordships could have reached their view as to fiduciary
status on two bases:
(i)
that the defendant, due to its past dealings, had a
higher degree of knowledge about the financial
condition of the shipping group in which the
borrowers resided and, therefore, was placed by
implication into a higher position of knowledge visA-vis the plaintiff; and
(ii)
that the defendant had abused its position of trust in
the financial community by inviting the plaintiff, a
smaller bank than that of the defendant, to
participate in a loan for the purpose of apportioning
65
its own financial burden on to the plaintiff;
d) it is arguable that Ackner and Oliver LJJ made their
comments based on a merged analysis of the defendant's
roles as both arranger and agent bank under the syndicated
loan and did not properly demarcate the duties attributed to
the defendant under each role; 66 and

e) the Court, in reaching its decision, neglected to consider
whether there was any term in the facility agreement or
related loan documentation that may have the effect of
64. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook (1986) 162 C.L.R. 376 (the High Court of Australia
rejected the antecedent approach taken by the Court in Waghom v. Waghom (1942) 65
C.L.R. 289 to follow the decision of the English Court of Appeal).
65. See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 27, at 3.45 (agrees on this point).
66. See MALLESONS, supra note 4, at 228, for a discussion on the role of an agent
bank and its relationship with other parties under a syndicated loan.
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negating the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the parties.67
Second, the fiduciary academic view finds secondary support in the
dissenting judgment of Mason J in Hospital Products. Mason J, while
acknowledging the "understandable reluctance to subject commercial
transactions to the equitable doctrine of constructive trust,, 68 considered
that it was "too simplistic, if not superficial, to suggest that commercial
transactions do not lend themselves to the creation of a relationship in
which one person comes under an obligation to act in the interests of
another." 69 Therefore, according to Mason J, a court should not refuse to
characterize a relationship as fiduciary solely because the relationship
appears primafacie arm's length.
In conclusion, absent any relevant Australian judicial consideration
of UBAF,7 ° the weight of academic opinion7 1 indicates that UBAF does
not presently represent good law in Australia, and consequently, would
not be followed by an Australian court. Moreover, it is unclear what
weight, if any, would be afforded by an Australian court to the dissenting
obiter dicta of Mason J in HospitalProducts.
3.

"Constructive Trustee" Academic View

As an adjunct to the fiduciary academic view, the dissenting
judgment delivered by Deane J in Hospital Products suggests that an
alternative formulation of equitable relief, namely the use of the
constructive trust, may be available to plaintiffs in a commercial setting,
such as the participant banks under a syndicated loan.72
Deane J opined that a plaintiff should not necessarily be barred from
obtaining equitable relief in certain commercial circumstances solely
because a court is unable to establish the existence of a fiduciary
relationship and a corresponding breach of fiduciary duty:
67. See infra Part V(A) for a brief discussion on the efficacy of excluding fiduciary
duties.
68. The constructive trust is a form of equitable relief available to an injured party
upon it establishing a breach of fiduciary duty. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp.
(1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 99.
69. Id. at 100.
70. To this author's knowledge, the only judicial consideration undertaken by an
Australian court of the decision in UBAF Ltd. v. European Am. Banking Corp., 2 W.L.R.
508 (Q.B. 1984) was by the High Court of Australia in Wardley Austl. Ltd. v. W. Austl.
(1992) 175 C.L.R. 514, 527-28, and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Mcrae v.
Coulton (1986) 7 N.S.W.L.R. 644, 664-65, where each Court only considered the UBAF
Ltd. decision with respect to issues pertaining to negligence and signed representations
and not in the context of syndicated loans generally.
71. See supra note 63. See also O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 176; G. Colless,
SyndicatedLoans-The Legal Relationship, 8(1) COM. L. Q. 13, 14 (1994).
72. Hosp. Prods.Ltd., 156 C.L.R. at 122-25.
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In my view the constructive trust pursuant to which the [defendant] is
liable to account for the profits... should properly be seen as
imposed as equitable relief appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the case ratherthan arisingfrom a breach of some
73
fiduciary dutyflowingfrom an identifiedfiduciaryrelationship.
Applying his alternative formulation of equitable relief to the facts in
HospitalProducts, Deane J reached the following conclusion:
[The plaintiff] was entitled to a declaration that the [defendant] was
liable to account as a constructive trustee for the profits of that
Australian business in accordance with the principles under which a
constructive trust may be imposed as the appropriate form of
equitable relief in circumstances where a person could not in good
conscience retain himself a benefit, or the proceeds of a benefit,
which he has apportioned to himself in breach
of his contractual or
74
other legal or equitable obligations to another.
However, while Deane J reasoned that it was appropriate to impose a
constructive trust over the defendant's profits in Hospital Products, he
failed to clearly articulate the circumstances in which a constructive trust
will be awarded to a plaintiff, commenting that:
[s]ince this particular aspect of the matter was not explored in
argument and a majority of the Court is of the view that there is no
basis for any finding of constructive trust however, it is preferable
that I defer until some subsequent occasion a more precise
identification of the principles governing
the imposition of a
75
constructive trust in such circumstances.
With respect, Deane J's judgment in Hospital Products is quite
controversial given traditional equitable canons.76 Under Deane J's
formulation, a court could grant equitable relief to a plaintiff, in the form
of a constructive trust, in circumstances where the defendant was merely
in breach of its contractual, not its fiduciary obligations. This approach
would have the effect of availing a plaintiff to superior equitable
remedies outside the sphere of a fiduciary relationship for a breach of
contract. Therefore, in the context of a syndicated loan, an Australian
court could hold an arranger as constructive trustee of participant banks
in respect to arranger fees in certain circumstances notwithstanding that
the arranger may not be characterized as a fiduciary of the participant
73.
74.
75.
76.
species
desired

Id. at 124 (emphasis added).
Id. at 125.
Id.
See, e.g., GLOVER, supra note 27, at 2.29 (considers Deane's approach to "be a
of fiduciary instrumentalism ... [where] a constructive trust was clearly the
outcome"). Id.
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banks.
In conclusion, while it is unclear what weight, if any, would be
afforded by an Australian court to the obiter dicta of Deane J in Hospital
Products, it is submitted that Deane J's alternative formulation of
equitable relief does not presently represent good law in Australia and
consequently would not be followed by an Australian court.
4.

"Shifting" Academic View

(a)

Scope of Theory

The "shifting" academic view was formulated as a result of the
perceived chameleon-like role adopted by an arranger of a syndicated
loan. Lehane7 7 and Bostock and Hambly, 78 each of whom are proponents
of the shifting academic view, submit that an arranger of a syndicated
loan will act as an agent of the borrower for some purposes but, for other
purposes, will act as an agent of the participant banks.
Specifically, the learned authors articulate the "shifting" role of an
arranger of a syndicated loan as follows:
a) The arranger first owes certain contractual obligations, as
well as equitable obligations that arise by operation of the
agency relationship, to the borrower upon it receiving a
mandate from the borrower to procure the syndicated loan.
These duties may include, for example, that the arranger use
its best efforts to procure full participation of the syndicated
loan and to ensure that the loan documentation is drafted in
such a manner so as to reflect, and not be inconsistent with,
the terms of the mandate letter; and
b) The obligations first owed by the arranger to the borrower
will effectively "shift" from the borrower to the participant
banks during the negotiation of the syndicated loan by the
arranger, for and on behalf of the participant banks, with the
borrower.
These duties may include, for example,
negotiating the loan documentation with the borrower in
accordance with the participant banks' instructions and in a
manner that is not contrary to their several interests.
The cohesiveness of Lehane and Bostock and Hambly's shifting
dichotomy hinges greatly upon a determination of when, if at all, the

77. J. Lehane, The Role of Managing and Agents Banks: Duties, Liabilities,
Disclaimer Clauses, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 235 (June 1982).
78. T. Bostock & J. Hambly, Loan Syndication, Seminar, Law Institute of Victoria,
July 1983.
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"shifting event" occurs and an analysis of the precise, and possibly
continuing, obligations owed by the arranger to the borrower pursuant to
the terms of the mandate letter. These separate, but related, issues are
examined in further detail below.
First, the learned authors submit that the "shifting event" occurs at
the moment that the arranger commences negotiation of the loan
documentation for and on behalf of the participant banks. 7 9 This point is
reinforced by Lehane who states that "the manager negotiates and settles
the loan documentation on [the participant80 banks'] behalf, and not as the
occupant of some neutral middle ground.,
However, it is perhaps a little too simplistic to suggest that there is
one defining moment when an arranger ceases to be the agent of the
borrower and becomes the agent of the participant banks. Instead, a
more flexible approach should be adopted in order to establish when a
"shifting event" occurs pursuant to the shifting dichotomy. This may be
achieved, for example, by assessing the scope of the role undertaken by
the arranger during the negotiation process. By adopting a flexible
approach, an Australian court may seek to resolve the following
questions:
a) Does the shifting event occur when the relevant banks
agree to participate in the loan or at a later time, such
as when the arranger engages in the negotiation
process? or,
b) If the arranger merely acts as a conduit for the
participant banks during the negotiation process and
does not act for and on their behalf, do these
circumstances suggest that the arranger's duties have
not shifted to the participant banks and remain with the
borrower?
Second, the learned authors apparently either disregard the express
or implied obligations owed by the arranger to the borrower pursuant to
the mandate letter or otherwise incorrectly assume that these obligations
will merge upon the occurrence of a "shifting event." 8 1 It is
understandable why these assumptions are made, for without them, there
is a real possibility that an arranger could be acting as agent for both the
borrower and the participant banks which, without the fully informed
consent of both principals, is impermissible because the arranger, as
agent for both the borrower and participant banks, would be placed in

79. The arranger may also negotiate the loan documentation in its own right should
it also be a participant in the syndicated loan.
80. Lehane, supra note 77.
81.

See O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 174 (agrees on this point).
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conflict with those duties owed to each principal.82
Unfortunately, reliance upon these assumptions necessarily affects
the merits of the shifting dichotomy, for the following reasons:
a) The mandate letter usually requires the arranger to
ensure that the loan documentation is drafted in such a
manner so as to reflect and not be inconsistent with its
terms and the terms of the applicable term sheet.
Accordingly, depending upon the exact wording of the
mandate letter, the arranger could owe contractual
duties, including possible equitable duties of fidelity,
to the borrower so as to ensure that the loan
documentation has been appropriately drafted; and
b) It is again a little too simplistic, albeit convenient, to
suggest that obligations owed by the arranger to the
borrower immediately cease upon the occurrence of
Even if certain contractual
the shifting event.
obligations are discharged by performance, the
arranger may continue to owe a duty of care to the
borrower with respect to the proper exercise of its
duties and functions as arranger 83 or a continuing duty
Moreover, save for an effective
of loyalty.8 4
disclaimer,85 the existence of any fiduciary obligations
on the part of the arranger will be incapable of
extinguishment or merger.
Lehane and Bostock and Hambly's shifting dichotomy is perhaps an
illustration of one method capable of rationalizing a seemingly
incompatible and conflicting set of commercial relationships formed
between an arranger and other parties under a syndicated loan. However,
the learned authors approach is not without fault, a problem only
exacerbated by the often lack of documentation addressing the rights and
obligations of an arranger under a syndicated loan.
In conclusion, absent any judicial guidance or endorsement of the
82. See, e.g., N. & S. Trust Co. v. Berkley, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 470 (Eng. Q.B.D.
(Comm.)). But see Kelly v. Cooper, [1992] 3 W.L.R. 936 (the Privy Council held that
the requisite consent required by an agent, whom acts for two or more principals, may be
implicitly obtained from each principal by having regard to the terms of the agency
agreement, such as the mandate letter in the case of the borrower and the term sheet in the
case of the participant banks).
83. An agent must act with reasonable care, skill and intelligence when performing
their duties as agent. See, e.g., Commonwealth Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. Weber,
Lohmann & Co. Ltd. [1905] A.C. 66, 77.
84. But see Attomey-Gen. v. Blake, [1998] 1 All E.R. 833, 841 (Eng. C.A. (Civ.
Div.)) (Lord Woolf MR rejected the "concept of a fiduciary obligation which continues
notwithstanding the determination of the particular relationship which gives rise to it").
85. See infra Part V(A) for a discussion on the efficacy of excluding fiduciary duties.
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shifting dichotomy, coupled with academic criticisms,8 6 it is submitted
that Lehane and Bostock and Hambly's shifting dichotomy does not filly
describe the set of relationships between parties to a syndicated loan nor
does it explain a pattern of general relationships between such parties.
As a consequence, an Australian court should not be constrained by the
logic adopted under the shifting dichotomy.
(b)

Arranger's Role When Accruing Arranger Fees

This article largely assumes that an arranger of a syndicated loan
will accrue the legal right to arranger fees in its capacity as arranger.87
However, this assumption may not always be satisfactory in cases where
a participant bank assumes both roles as arranger and agent bank under a
syndicated loan.
As a corollary to the "shifting" academic view, it is conceivable that
an arranger, who also assumes the role of agent bank under a syndicated
loan, may enjoy the benefit of arranger fees upon or after the assumption
of its new role as agent bank, provided that the legal right to arranger
fees has not already been discharged by performance. For example, this
situation could arise where any service or function provided to the
borrower by the arranger in consideration of arranger fees is continuing
or where the arranger, who is now the agent bank, receives the arranger
fees after it has ceased its role as arranger. Therefore, the concern is that
should an arranger receive the benefit of arranger fees in its capacity as
agent bank and not as arranger of the syndicated loan, there is a
possibility that the arranger will do so as agent for the participant banks
and that, subject to any contractual modifications,88 the agent bank may
89
be required to account to the participant banks for arranger fees.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to consider the fiduciary
status of an agent bank under a syndication loan in any detail, it is
generally accepted that, subject to any contractual modification, an agent
bank will be a fiduciary of the participant banks. 90 This position was
supported in Chemical Bank v. Security Pacific National Bank,91 where
the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agent
86. See generally O'Sullivan, supra note 8.
87. See supra Part II(B)(2).
88. See, e.g., NZI Sec. Ltd. v. Unity Group Ltd. (Unreported, High Court of New
Zealand, Wylie J, Feb. 11, 1992). See also infra Part V(A).
89. See infra Part IV.
90. It is a settled matter of law that the relationship of agency is of a fiduciary
nature. See, e.g., Parker v. McKenna, (1874) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 96, 199 (Eng. L.C.);
Keith Henry & Co. Pty Ltd. v. Stuart Walker & Co. Pty Ltd. (1958) 100 C.L.R. 342, 350.
See A. Mugasha, The Agent Bank's Possible Fiduciary Liability to Syndicate Banks, 27
CAN. Bus. L. J. 403 (1996).
91. Chem. Bank v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 20 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 1994).
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bank's mere designation as "agent" was sufficient enough to give rise to
a fiduciary relationship.92 In addition, in NZI Securities Ltd. v. Unity
Group Ltd.,93 the High Court of New Zealand held that the "[agent bank]
in respect of its function
was in a fiduciary relationship to the plaintiffs
94
as a member of and agent for the syndicate."
Therefore, where an arranger also assumes the role of agent bank
under a syndicated loan, careful consideration should be made of the
relevant factual circumstances so as to ensure that:
a) the right to the arranger fees does not accrue in
consideration of any service or function performed by
the arranger to the participant banks in its capacity as
agent bank;
b) as a temporal matter, any service or function
performed by the arranger in that capacity has not
merged with its separate role as agent bank or is
otherwise continuing when the arranger assumes its
role as agent bank;
c) where possible, the arranger is paid any arranger fees
prior to it becoming the agent bank under a syndicated
loan; and
d) appropriate contractual disclaimers are used to refute
the existence of any fiduciary relationship between the
parties. 95
In conclusion, this article assumes that an arranger whom also acts
as the agent bank under a syndicated loan will not derive the benefit of
the arranger fees in its capacity as agent bank. However, arrangers of
syndicated loans should be mindful that if it is determined that the
benefit to any arranger fees was enjoyed by an arranger in its capacity as
agent bank and not as arranger of a syndicated loan, there is a risk that
the said arranger will owe equitable duties to account to the participant
banks for the receipt of such arranger fees procured in its capacity as
agent for the participant banks.96

92. But see Kennedy v. De Trafford, [1897] A.C. 180, 188 (Eng. H.L.) (Herschell LJ
said "[a] person may be spoken of as an 'agent' ... although when it is attempted to
suggest that he is an 'agent' under such circumstances as create the legal obligations
attaching to agency, that use of the word is only misleading").
93. NZI Sec. Ltd. v. Unity Group Ltd. (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand,
Wylie J, Feb. 11, 1992).
94. Id. at 19.
95. See infra Part V(A).
96. See infra Part IV(A).
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C. Observationson Arranger-ParticipantBank FiduciaryTheory
Given the reluctance on the part of common law courts to
meaningfully describe the application of a fiduciary relationship to a
commercial environment, it is decidedly difficult to describe the
circumstances in which an arranger will be a fiduciary of the participant
banks under a syndicated loan. Perhaps, as a starting point, the
comments of Mason J in HospitalProducts should be digested:
The fact that in the great majority of commercial transactions the
parties stand at arm's length does not enable [the Court] to make a
generalisation that is universally true in relation to every commercial
transaction. In truth, every such transaction must be examined on its
merits with a view to ascertaining 97whether it manifests the
characteristics of a fiduciary relationship.
This part provides this author's observations on which academic
view should be preferred by Australian courts when confronted with the
question of determining whether an arranger is a fiduciary of the
participant banks under a syndicated loan, given current judicial trends.
1.

"Arm's Length" Academic View-A Preferred Approach

It is generally accepted that a determination made by an Australian
court of the nature of the relationship between an arranger and the
participant banks will necessarily determine the existence and scope of
any fiduciary relationship. 98 However, finding an established rule
utilized by Australian courts to characterize the precise scope of the
contractual, and possible equitable relationship between the relevant
parties is far less certain.
Dal Pont and Chalmers suggest that a contractual relationship, such
as the relationship between an arranger and the participant banks, could
be examined by an Australian court with respect to whether or not the
relationship exhibits any intrinsic fiduciary characteristics according to
the following three-tiered approach: 99
a) the contractual relationship between an arranger and
the participant banks may in itself dictate that fiduciary
duties should be superimposed on the pre-existing
contractual duties under the syndicated loan in order to
00
secure the requisite loyalty demanded by equity;'
97. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 41, 100.
98. See, e.g., News Ltd. v. Austl. Rugby Football League Ltd. (1996) 139 A.L.R.
193, 312. See also DAL PONT & CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 4.25.
99. DAL PONT & CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 4.25-4.26.
100.

See, e.g., Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 156 C.L.R. at 99-100.
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b) a contractual term may be so precise in its regulation
of what an arranger can or cannot do vis-A-vis the
participant banks that there is no scope for imposing
any fiduciary duties; 01' or
c) the contractual relationship between an arranger and
the participant banks may be capable of delineation
where, with respect to some areas of conduct the
arranger will owe fiduciary obligations to the
participant banks but in respect to others, the arranger
02
retains its inherent laissez-faireeconomic liberty.
As a general proposition, the existence and scope of fiduciary duties
owed by an arranger to the participant banks will usually be determined
by reference to the contract, whether express or implied, between the
parties. 10 3
However, an Australian court must also take into
consideration all of the circumstances that form the relevant relationship
inter se. 10 4 Moreover, a court may choose to disregard the contractual
covenants made between the parties in circumstances where the parties
act in a manner that is contrary to such covenants, such as in the case of
an estoppel.' 0 5
While the High Court of Australia has imparted some guidance
upon inferior courts as to the appropriateness of invoking a fiduciary
relationship in a commercial environment, 10 6 the analysis undertaken by
an Australian court as to the nature of the relationship between an
arranger and the participant banks will necessarily vary on a case-by-case
basis. Accordingly, subject to the existence of any special inequitable
circumstances between the arranger and the participant banks, 0 7 the
arm's length academic view should be preferred by an Australian court
for at least the following reasons:
a) it is generally accepted that participant banks are
sophisticated and will enter into the syndicated loan
and related relationships on the basis of their own skill
101. Id. at 98.
102. See, e.g., Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 C.L.R. 71 (the High Court of Australia
concluded that while the doctor-patient relationship has not traditionally been
characterized as a fiduciary relationship, insofar as issues of loyalty are concerned, the
doctor should not enter into an engagement that places his or her own interest, or a duty
to a third party, in conflict with his or her duty to the patient).
103. See, e.g., Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1994] 3 W.L.R. 761, 799 (Eng.
H.L.).
104. See, e.g., Kelly v. C A & L Bell Commodities Corp. (1989) 18 N.S.W.L.R. 248,
256.
105. See, e.g., Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd. v. Maher (1988) 164 C.L.R. 387.
106. See, e.g., Hosp. Prods. Ltd. 156 C.L.R. 41; Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 C.L.R.
71.
107. See infra Part III(C)(2).
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and independent and carefully considered judgment.
Participant banks enter into contracts at their own risk;
b) as correctly articulated by O'Sullivan:
Whilst it is true that [participant banks] will
frequently not have the same amount or quality of
information as [an arranger], this is not because of
the lack of availability of such information. In the
usual case, participant banks not only have the
means of acquiring knowledge but also are positively
encouraged (by warnings
in the information
1°8
memorandum) to do so.
Accordingly, participant banks are usually encouraged
by the arranger to undertake their own independent
inquiries of the borrower and assessment of the
relevant risks prior to entering into a syndicated loan,
and do not otherwise rely solely upon the data set out
in the information memorandum;10 9
c) as it is customary for the borrower to pay a fee to the
arranger in consideration of it arranging the syndicated
loan, it is arguable that participant banks will have
knowledge of, or further will expect, the payment of
such fees. This factor may serve to negative the
existence of any possible fiduciary relationship;
d) the arm's length academic view has been preferred in
other common law jurisdictions, perhaps with the
exception of the UBAF Court"0 and the propensity of
Canadian courts to expand the fiduciary principle in
some cases, 1' whose judgments may be persuasive
upon Australian courts. 1 2
For example, in the United States, the relationship
between an arranger and the participant banks under a
108. O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 177.
109. This position may be strengthened if the participant banks contractually agree
and acknowledge to the arranger that they are entering into the syndicated loan solely on
the basis of their own skill and carefully considered judgment and not upon any
representation, whether express or implied, made by the arranger.
110. But see supra Part III(B)(2), where it is argued that the decision in UBAF is
unlikely to be binding or otherwise highly persuasive upon an Australian court.
111. See, e.g., Standard Invs. Ltd. v. Can. Imperial Bank of Commerce, (1985) 52
O.R.2d 473 (the Ontario Court of Appeal held that a bank was a fiduciary of one of its
customer by reason that it had provided some assistance and advice to the customer in
respect to the customer's personal financial plans.) But see Breen v. Williams (1996) 186
C.L.R. 71; Carlin, supra note 23.
112. See, e.g., Waghorn v. Waghom (1942) 65 C.L.R. 289.
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syndicated loan is not considered to be fiduciary in
nature because the parties are sophisticated and
contract at arm's length to one another.113 This
approach was endorsed in In re Colocotronis Tanker
Securities Litigation, 1 4 where the New York Supreme
Court held that, albeit in the context of a syndicated
participation and not a syndicated loan, 1 5 "[syndicated
participation] agreements are arm's-length contracts
between relatively sophisticated financial institutions
and do not establish fiduciary relationships such as
exist between the management of a corporation and
the corporation's shareholders or even its debenture
holders;"' 16
e) participant banks generally understand that arrangers
often have an existing relationship with the borrower,
such as pre-existing loan facilities or a commercial
day-to-day banking relationship, and expect the
arranger to protect its interests so as to ensure that its
rights are not subordinated to the participant banks to
any greater extent than is required under the terms of
the mandate letter.' 17 These pre-existing relationships
may serve to negative the existence of any possible
fiduciary relationship between the arranger and bank
participants; and
f) outside of any legal arguments, the practical effect of
imposing a fiduciary relationship between an arranger
and participant bank would be to place the arranger in
a difficult, if not untenable, position with the
borrower." 8
Therefore, from a commercial
perspective, if an arranger owed fiduciary duties to the
participant banks under a syndicated loan, it is possible
that the arranger may be unable to fully meet its
113. See, e.g., Banque Arabe et Internationale D'Investissement v. Md. Nat'l Bank,
819 F. Supp. 1282, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 57 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 1995); Banco
Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat'! Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd,
973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992). See also A. Mugasha, Evolving Standards of Conduct
(FiduciaryDuty, Good Faith and Reasonableness) and Commercial Certainty in MultiLender Contracts,45 WAYNE L. REv. 1789, 1807-13 (2000).
114. In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. See supra Part II(A).
116. In re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. at 833.
117. O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 177.
118. For example, the arranger could possibly owe fiduciary duties
contemporaneously to the borrower and the participant banks which is impermissible at
law. See supra note 82.
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contractual, equitable or other ethical duties owed to
the borrower and participant banks concurrently,
including the preservation of the arranger's own
commercial self interest, because of the inherent
commercial and adversarial relationships formed by
virtue of the syndicated loan.
2.

Special Inequitable Circumstances

While this article contends that the arm's length academic view is to
be preferred, Australian courts may be influenced by any underlying
inequality, reliance, vulnerability or dependency 9 that a participant
bank may have upon the arranger prior to it entering into the syndicated
loan. Accordingly, it is instructive to consider two cases on this point. 0
In Natwest AustraliaBank Ltd. v. TricontinentalCorporationLtd. 12
(hereinafter Natwest), the Supreme Court of Victoria was asked to
consider where it was alleged that the participant bank was unfairly
induced by the arranger into participating in the relevant syndicated loan
on the false representation that the financial statements as set out in the
information memorandum and provided by the arranger gave a true and
fair value of the borrower at all material times.1 21 It was further alleged
that the information memorandum provided by the arranger had failed to
disclose certain pre-existing contingent liabilities of the borrower,
including a guarantee granted by the borrower in favor of the arranger,
and that disclosure of this information would have been important for the
bank participant to know at the time of its assessment as to whether or
not it should participate in the syndicated loan. 22 The participant bank
claimed that the representations made in relation to the financial
statements and the failure to disclose the contingent liabilities as created
by the guarantees amounted to conduct on the part of the arranger that
was negligent at common law as well as misleading and deceptive,
contrary to section 52 of the Trade Practices Act, 1974 (Austl.) and
section 11 of the Fair Trading Act, 1974 (Vict.). Further, and in the
alternative, the bank participant claimed that the arranger owed a
119. See, e.g., LAC Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Res. Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574 (the
Court examined the "vulnerability" or "dependency" of the plaintiff).
120. Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme
Court of Victoria, McDonald J, July 26, 1993). Note that there is a parallel reported
citation of the judgment in Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd. (1993)
A.T.P.R. (Digest) 46-109. However, the unreported citation is preferred in this Article
because it contains the substantive judgment of McDonald J and is not otherwise
expressed in digest form. Moreover, there is no reference to the fiduciary argument in
the reported judgment.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id. at 8.
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fiduciary duty to disclose all known facts relating to the affairs of the
borrower that a prudent banker would regard as being relevant to the
participant bank in making a decision whether or not to participate in the
syndicated loan. 123 The arranger lodged a defense to these claims and
also sought to rely upon the terms of an exclusion clause contained in the
information memorandum.
The Court in Natwest found in favor of the participant bank on the
grounds of negligence and statutory misleading and deceptive conduct on
the part of the arranger. In addition, the Court refused to uphold the
terms of the arranger's exclusion clause. 24 However, having made this
finding, the Court declined to consider the alternative argument
concerning the question of fiduciary status.
In another case, Sumitomo Bank Ltd. v. Banque Bruxelles Lambert
SA (hereinafter Sumitomo), 125 the High Court of England and Wales held
that an arranger had assumed responsibility for making certain
disclosures under mortgage indemnity guarantee insurance policies
obtained for the benefit of the participant bank, and that the arranger's
failure to make such disclosures constituted a breach of its duty of care
owed to the participant bank. 126 This finding was also contrary to the
127
terms of an exclusion clause contained in the loan agreement.
However, again, the Court, in finding in favor of the participant bank
directed its attention to establishing a breach of duty of care on the part
of the arranger, and not the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the arranger and participant bank.
In conclusion, while the Natwest and Sumitomo Courts did not
expressly address the question of relief in the context of a breach of
fiduciary duty, it seems apparent that these Courts were influenced by the
totality of the perceived inequitable circumstances surrounding the loss
sustained by the relevant participant bank.
For example, some
commentators submit that the Sumitomo Court was influenced in its
decision to find a breach of duty of care because the arranger, who was
also the agent, obtained substantial arranger fees even though it only
assumed minimal risk in the syndicated loan due to its limited
participation. 128
Therefore, what may be discerned from these judgments, and
123. Id.
124. See infra Part V(A) (for an examination of the Natwest Court's finding in respect
of the exclusion clause).
125. Sumitomo Bank Ltd. v. Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA, [1997] 1 Lloyd's Rep.
487 (Eng. Q.B.D. (Comm.).
126. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 63, at 185-86.
127. See infra Part (V)(A) (for an examination of the Sumitomo court's finding in
respect of the exclusion clause).
128. Id.
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possibly from the decision in UABF, is that a common law court may be
willing to invoke fiduciary status in circumstances where a participant
bank has entered into a syndicated loan solely or predominately on an
inducement or representation made by the arranger, including on account
of silence by the arranger, where that inducement or representation:
a) constitutes a misrepresentation, is misleading or deceptive,
or is caused by the arranger in breach of its duty of care to
the participant bank; and
b) causes the participant bank to be vulnerable to or at the
mercy of the arranger or otherwise creates an inequitable set
of circumstances, such as a gross apportionment of risk
from the arranger to the participant banks, which may only
be satisfactorily cured in equity.
IV.

A Duty to Account Arranger Fees to the Participant Banks

The application of this part is largely predicated upon a
determination by a court that an arranger is a fiduciary of the participant
banks in connection with its receipt of arranger fees under a syndicated
loan. 129 If the relationship between an arranger and the participant banks
is characterized as fiduciary in nature, it is axiomatic that an arranger
will owe certain equitable obligations to the participant banks with
respect to its receipt of any arranger fees. However, even where an
arranger is not characterized as a fiduciary of the participant banks, it is
still possible that the arranger may be subject to criminal liability under
Australian secret commissions legislation.
Therefore, assuming that a relevant court considers the arranger to
be a fiduciary of the participant banks, this part examines the possible
extent and impact that any equitable obligations or secret commission
legislation may have upon an arranger with respect to its receipt of
arranger fees under a syndicated loan.
A.

Equitable Obligationsof an Arranger

The equitable obligations of a fiduciary can be underscored
by the
30
1
Williamson:
v.
Tate
in
Chelmsford
Lord
of
statement
classic
Wherever two persons stand in such a relation that, while it
continues, confidence is necessarily reposed by one, and the
influence which naturally grows out of that confidence is possessed
by the other, and this confidence is abused, or the influence is exerted
to obtain an advantage at the expense of the confiding party, the
129.
130.

See supra Part III.
Tate v. Williamson, (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. App. 55 (Eng. L.C.).
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person so availing himself of his position will not be permitted to
retain the advantage, although the transaction could 131
not have been
impeached if no such confidential relation had existed.
The concerns propounded by the courts of equity with respect to one
party's inherent vulnerability, dependency or reliance upon another
person in circumstances that give rise to a fiduciary relationship has led
to the development of two fundamental proscriptive equitable duties:
1. a fiduciary must not place its duty as a fiduciary in conflict
with its own self interest unless the fiduciary has made full
disclosure to its principal as to the exact nature and extent
of such interest, and the principal has given its fully
informed consent; and
2. a fiduciary must not make a profit out of its relationship
with its principal unless the fiduciary has made full
disclosure to its principal as to the exact nature and extent
of such profit, and the principal has given its fully informed
1 32
consent.
Based on these overarching equitable duties, two specific rules of equity
have evolved that may affect the lawfulness of an arranger's receipt of
arranger fees in circumstances where the arranger is a fiduciary of the
participant banks under a syndicated loan. The possible application of
these rules to an arranger of a syndicated loan are examined in detail,
below.
1.

Duty to Account for Unauthorized Profit

It is an equitable proscription of a fiduciary not to make "an
unauthorized profit from the property over which the fiduciary has
control or title or from knowledge acquired
in the course of acting as a
31pp,
4
,,133
P
fiduciary.
In Boardman v. Phipps, Lord Denning MR provided a
classic treatise of this duty.
It is quite clear that if an agent uses property, with which he has been
entrusted by his principal, so as to make a profit for himself out of it,
without his principal's consent, then he is accountable for it to his
principal.... So, also, if he uses a position of authority, to which he
has been appointed by his principal, so as to gain money by means of
131. Id. at61.
132. LexisNexis Butterworths OnLine, Halsbury's Laws of Australia, [15-175],
availableat www.Lexisnexis.com/au.
133.

G. DAL PONT, LAW OF AGENCY 12.2 (2001).

See also Boardman v. Phipps,

[1965] Ch. 992, 1030-31 (Eng. C.A.) affd [1967] 2 A.C. 46; Powell & Thomas v. Evan
Jones & Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 11, 21 (Eng. C.A.).
134. Boardman, [1965] Ch 992.
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it for himself, then also he is accountable to his principal for it....
Likewise with information or knowledge which he has been
employed by his principal to collect or discover, or which he has
otherwise acquired,for the use of his principal, the agent if he turns it
to his own use, so as to make a profit by means of it for himself, he is
accountable,., for such information or knowledge is the property of
his principal, just as much as an invention is....
Where a court has held that an agent unlawfully derived a profit from its
principal without the knowledge or consent of its principal, a court must
then assess the quantum of the unlawful profit so derived by having
regard to all of the circumstances surrounding the agent's breach of
fiduciary duties, including to what extent, if any, the unlawful profit was
derived as a result of the agent's own skill, efforts and resources. This
analysis was conducted in Warman InternationalLtd. v. Dwyer, 136 where
the Full Court of the High Court of Australia held that it was appropriate
for an agent to retain a proportion of the unlawful profits in issue because
these profits had been largely generated by the skill, efforts and resources
of the agent. Therefore, in some circumstances, an agent will not be
required to hold on account of its principal all profits that flow its
137
egregious action.
However, in the case of arranger fees, it would seem unlikely that a
court would agree to only disgorge a portion of any arranger fees in favor
of the participant banks because an arranger would have difficulty
demonstrating that it had generated the arranger fees predominately as a
result of its own skill, efforts and resources, and not solely by reason of
the fact that it was agent of the participant banks. In an analogous
38
example, the House of Lords in Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver'
reasoned that:
the directors standing in a fiduciary relationship to Regal in regard to
the exercise of their powers as directors, and having obtained these
shares by reason and only by reason of the fact that they were
directors of Regal and in the course of the execution of that office,
39
are accountable for the profits which have been made out of them. 1
Therefore, provided that an arranger is held to be a fiduciary of the
participant banks at all relevant times, upon application of the strict
unauthorized profit rule, it is likely that an arranger will be required to
account to the participant banks for the entirety of any arranger fees it
135. Id. at 1018-19.
136. Warman Int'l Ltd. v. Dwyer (1995) 182 C.L.R. 544.
137. See id.
138. Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134 (Eng. H.L.).
139. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
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receives from a borrower under a syndicated loan, unless40the participant
1
banks have otherwise given their fully informed consent.
2.

Duty Not to Be in Receipt of a Secret Commission

It is an equitable proscription of an agent not to secretly gain a
financial or other advantage, otherwise known as a "secret commission,"
14 1
for itself or a third party as a result of its exercise of authority as agent.
The term "secret commission," used interchangeably with the term
"bribe" under English law, 142 has been characterized as "a1 43gift accepted
by a fiduciary as an inducement to him to betray his trust.'
144
In Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Johnson,
Latham CJ clearly articulated the specific nature of the rule against the
receipt of a secret commission by an agent.
If A is dealing with B through A's agent C, that agent cannot, without
disclosure to A, take an retain a commission received by him from B
in respect of that dealing. It is immaterial that he takes it as agent for
a commission from B
B. But, if A knows that the agent is obtaining
145
and consents, the position is then different.
The receipt of a secret commission by an agent is a primafacie breach of
the agent's fiduciary duties owed to its principal, regardless of whether
or not the principal suffered harm, 14 6 unless the receipt of the
commission was made with the fully informed consent of the principal.
The strict nature of this rule is grounded in the fact that the receipt of a
secret commission by an agent is deemed to adversely affect the agent's
loyalty owed to its principal; the fundamental hallmark of the agency
relationship. 147 For example, in Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v.
Ansell, 148 Bowen LJ characterized the receipt of a secret commission by
an agent as:
a wrongful act, inconsistent with his duty towards his master and the
140. See, e.g., Morison v. Thompson, (1874) L.R. 9 Q.B. 480. See also infra Part
V(B),in relation to obtaining the fully informed consent of the participant banks.
141.

See, e.g., G. FRIDMAN, LAW OF AGENCY 181 (7thed. 1996).

142. See, e.g., Indus. & Gen. Mortgage Co. Ltd. v. Lewis, [1949] 2 All E.R. 573, 575
(Eng. K.B.).
143. Attorney Gen. for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 A.C. 324, 331 (P.C.N.Z.).
144. Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Johnson (1937) 60 C.L.R. 189.
145. Id. at 215.
146. See, e.g., Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell (1888) 39 Ch. D. 339,
365.
147. A fiduciary is "irrebuttably" presumed to be influenced away from his or her
duties upon the receipt of a secret commission. See, e.g., Hovenden & Sons v. Millhof
(1900) 83 L.T. 41, 43.
148. Boston Deep Sea Fishing,39 Ch. D. 339.
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continuance of confidence between them... whether such profit be
given to him in return for services which he actually performs for the
third party, or whether it be given to him for his supposed
49 influence,
or whether it be given to him on any other ground at all.'
Therefore, provided that an arranger is held to be a fiduciary of the
participant banks at all relevant times, it is also likely that an arranger
will be required to account to the participant banks for the entirety of any
arranger fees it receives from a borrower under a syndicated loan, unless
the participant banks have given their fully informed consent.150
B. Secret Commissions Legislation
Most Australian legislatures, excluding the Commonwealth' 5' and
the Australian Capital Territory, 152 consider that the receipt of a secret
commission by an agent to be so repugnant that it is necessary to codify
into the body of criminal law the equitable proscription that an agent not
53
be in receipt of a commission lawfully due to its principal.
This part analyzes the scope of Australian legislation designed to
criminalize the receipt or solicitation of a secret commission by an agent
in certain circumstances and examines whether such legislation may
affect the lawfulness of an arranger's receipt or solicitation of arranger
fees from the borrower under a syndicated loan.
1.

Regulatory Background

Broadly, the object of Australian secret commissions legislation
remains largely consistent across all of the relevant jurisdictions and is
aimed to prevent an agent from being placed into a position of

149. Id. at 363.
150. See Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, (1967] 2 A.C. 134 (Eng. H.L.).
151. On May 24, 2001, the former Secret Commissions Act, 1905 (Austl.) was
repealed by the Criminal Code Amendment (Theft, Fraud, Bribery and Related Offences)
Act, 2000 (Austl.), which also had the effect of amending the Criminal Code (Austl.)
(promulgated under the Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Austl.)) by inserting new offenses in
relation to unlawful benefits received by public officials and false or misleading
statements or accounts made by an agent with the intent to defraud its principal). See
Criminal Code (Austl.) §§ 142.1,145.4-145.5.
152. Pursuant to the Seat of Government (Administration) Act, 1910 (Austl.), any
Commonwealth secret commissions legislation existing from time to time will apply to
the Australian Capital Territory.
153. See Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.); Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.); Secret Commissions
Prohibition Act, 1920 (S. Austl.); Criminal Code (Queensl.) (promulgated under the
Criminal Code Act, 1899 (Queensl.)); Criminal Code (Tas.) (promulgated under the
Criminal Code Act, 1924 (Tas.)); Criminal Code (W. Austl.) (promulgated under the
Criminal Code Act Compilation Act, 1913 (W. Austl.)); Criminal Code (N. Terr.)
(promulgated under the Criminal Code Act, 1983 (N. Ter.)).
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temptation' 54 by prohibiting the receipt or solicitation of a secret
commission
from persons who have business relations with its
55
principal.
However, the regulatory dichotomy of secret commissions
legislation in Australia does vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. With
the exception of South Australia which has adopted its own sui generis
legislation, Australian State and Territory secret commissions legislation
is incorporated into the general criminal law legislation of each relevant
jurisdiction. 56
The secret commissions legislation of Victoria, 57
58
Queensland,'
South Australia 59 and Western Australia 60 tends to
follow the same basic legislative schema. By contrast, while adopting a
different legislative approach to that of the foregoing jurisdictions, the
62
16
secret commissions legislation of New South Wales ' and Tasmania
remains substantially similar in its structure. However, the Northern
Territory 163 has couched its secret commissions legislation
in simpler
64
terms to that under the abovementioned jurisdictions.'
Given that it is impractical to undertake an individual analysis of
each piece of Australian secret commissions legislation, this article
examines the secret commissions legislation promulgated under the
Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) (hereinafter Crimes Act) as being largely
representative of the Australian statutory position in relation to the
receipt of secret commissions by agents.
2.

The Offense

Section 176(1) of the Crimes Act sets out the offense relating to the
unlawful receipt by an agent of certain benefits on account of its
principal's business, as follows.
Whosoever being an agent corruptly receives or solicits from any
person for himself or for any other person any valuable
consideration:

154. See, e.g., R v. Wellbum, Nurdin & Randel (1979) 69 Crim. App. R. 254, 265.
155. See, e.g., R v. Keane (1920) 30 N.S.W. St. R. 63, 64. See generally DAL PONT,
supra note 133, at 14.1.
156. See supra note 151.
157. Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) § 176.
158. Criminal Code (Queensl.) § 442A.
159. Secret Commissions Prohibition Act 1920 (S. Austl.) § 5
160. Criminal Code (W. Austl.) § 546.
161. Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.) § 249B.
162. Criminal Code (Tas.) § 266.
163. Criminal Code (N. Terr.) § 236.
164. SeeDALPONT, supranote 133, at 14.2.
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as an inducement or reward for or otherwise on
account of doing or forbearing to do or having
done or forborne to do any act in relation to his
principal'saffairs or business; or

b) the receipt or any expectation of which would in
any way tend to influence him to show or to
forbear to show favour or disfavour to any person
in relation to his principal'saffairs or business;

shall be guilty of an indictable offence (emphasis added).
A successful prosecution under section 176(1) of the Crimes Act must
satisfy certain inclusive indicia. These indicia are considered in detail in
this part with respect to their possible application to an arranger on
account of its receipt of arranger fees under a syndicated loan.
(a)

Arranger as an "Agent"

Section 175(1) of the Crimes Act defines "agent" inclusively to
include, as is relevant to this article, "any corporation or other person
acting or having been acting or desirous or intending to act for or on
behalf of any corporation or other person whether as... banker... or in
any other capacity."
The definition of agent set out in the Crimes Act is significantly
broader in its scope than any common law construction of the same
term. 165 In addition, the statutory extension of the definition of "agent"
to a person "having been acting.., or intending to act.., for or on

behalf of any corporation.. ." (emphasis added) circumvents any
argument that an agent had only received its secret commission before
the relevant agent commenced or after the relevant agency was
terminated. 166 Accordingly, in the context of arranger fees, this may
have the effect of capturing any arranger fees received by an arranger
after it had ceased its role as arranger under a syndicated loan, such as by
167
assuming a role as agent bank.
However, despite the broad statutory construction of the term
"agent" under the Crimes Act, a relevant court, when confronted with a
question of determining whether or not an arranger is an "agent" for the
purposes of the Crimes Act, must have regard to the complete
circumstances surrounding the arranger's relationship to the participant
banks, including any factual circumstances that suggest:
165. See, e.g., R v. Gallagher [1986] V.R. 210, 224.
166. See, e.g., The King v. Brewer (1942) 66 C.L.R. 535.
167. See supra Part III(B)(4)(b).
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a) the arranger may not have been acting on behalf of the
participant banks at the time that it solicited funding
commitments from the participant banks; or
b) the arranger procured the funding commitments from
the participant banks in its capacity as common law
agent of the borrower.
In conclusion, while it can be argued that an arranger is not the agent of
the participant banks under a syndicated loan at common law, it is still
possible that an arranger could be the statutory "agent" of the participant
banks for the purposes of section 175(1) of the Crimes Act.
(b)

Meaning of "Corruptly"

The requirement that the agent acts "corruptly" when it receives or
solicits the relevant secret commission is the core indicia necessary to
establish the offense created under section 176(1) of the Crimes Act.
Unfortunately, Australian and English case law has not clearly
articulated the precise meaning of the term "corruptly" for the purposes
of secret commissions legislation. Early case authority suggested that
the term "corruptly" is equivalent to the term "dishonestly."' 68 However,
this analysis created academic disagreement as to whether the terms are
in fact legally synonymous or whether the term "dishonestly" imports a
higher standard. 169 Fortunately, modem authority has overcome these
difficulties by adopting a more flexible approach. Australian and
Canadian courts have determined that an act undertaken "corruptly" is
analogous to an act undertaken in a manner that is prohibited by statute
where the actor has a wrongful intention, 170 an evil mind17 1 or mala
fides. 172 For example, in R v. Dillon and Riach,173 the Supreme Court of
Victoria held that "an agent does act corruptly if he receives a benefit in
the belief that the giver intends that it should influence him to show
favour in relation to the principal's affairs."'' 74 Moreover, in R v.
Gallagher,175 the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court stated that
"it is the intention of the person either giving or receiving, as the case
may be, at the time of the passing of the consideration which is relevant
to whether the behavior charged was corrupt within the meaning of the
168.
236.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See, e.g., C v. Johnson (1967) S.A. St. R. 279; R v. Calland [1967] Crim. L.R.
See, e.g., DAL PONT, supra note 133, at 14.12-14.13.
See, e.g., R v. Jamieson (1988) V.R. 879, 833.
See, e.g., R v. Worthington (1921) V.L.R. 660, 673, 682-84.
See, e.g., R v. Goss (1946) O.R. 1,9.
R v. Dillon & Riach (1982) V.R. 434.
Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
R v. Gallagher (1987) 29 A. Crim. R. 220.
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176

As postured by Dal Pont, "it is the intention, or perhaps more
accurately the belief, 177 of the person either giving or receiving, as the
case may be, at the time of the passing of consideration which is relevant
to whether or not the behavior charged is corrupt."' 178 Therefore,
according to Dal Pont, it is not necessary that the prohibited act
"actually" corrupts the intended party; what is important is that the
relevant actor held the "belief' that benefit would corrupt the intended
party.
The difficulties associated with a determination of what constitutes
"corruptly" had been overcome in the Commonwealth and Australian
Capital Territory 179 under the former Secret Commissions Act, 1905
(Austl.). By contrast, the Secret Commissions Act, 1905 (Austl.)
replaced the onus of a court to determine whether or not a bargain was
made "corruptly" with a determination of whether or not the commission
was procured without the full knowledge or consent of the principal.
However, even though the Crimes Act does not expressly require a court
to consider whether an agent obtained the fully informed consent of its
principal prior to its receipt of a commission, it would seem apparent that
an agent could not be acting in a "corrupt" manner for the purposes of
the Crimes Act if it received a commission
for its own account with the
80
fully informed consent of its principal.1
On balance, this approach seems to be consistent with that taken by
the Victorian Supreme Court in R v. Jamieson,181 where Young CJ stated
that a person acts corruptly:
If he made a payment to a person intending that its receipt should
influence the person being an agent of the requisite character, to show
favour to the giver in relation to the affairs of his principal. It is not
possible to import into that element a requirement that it be
established in addition that the giver intended to conceal the nature of
the payment from the agent's principal, although it is difficult to
imagine a case in which the maker of a payment to an agent could be
found to have acted corruptly if he had informed the agent's principal
176. Id. at 230.
177. In R v. Gallagher (1987) 29 A. Crim. R. 33, 35, the Victorian Court of Criminal
Appeal determined that the formulation of the meaning of "corruptly," so far as the
recipients of a secret commission are concerned, "refers to belief and it is not to be
thought that the formulation was intended to require knowledge."

178.

DAL PONT,

supra note 133, at 14.13.

179. See supranote 151.
180. Contra R. v. Scott [1907] V.L.R. 471 (authority for the principle that the mere
fact that a secret commission has been given raises the presumption it was given
corruptly).
181. R. v. Jamieson [1988] V.R. 879.
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of the payment. 1

In conclusion, a court's assessment of whether a person held a
requisite belief at a particular point of time is factual in nature.' 83 In
circumstances where the alleged offender is a corporation, it is the
intention of the corporation's officers that determines whether the
corporation acted corruptly.' 84 Therefore, in the context of a receipt of
arranger fees by an arranger, a court must inquire as to whether or not the
relevant corporate officer of the arranger held a "belief' at the time of its
receipt of the arranger fees that such fees were given by the borrower as
a reward for or on account of doing an act by the arranger in relation to
the participant bank's affairs or business, such as the arrangement of the
syndicated loan. The merits of this later point are considered in further
detail in Part V(C)(2)(d) below.
(c)

Meaning of "Valuable Consideration"

Section 175(1) of the Crimes Act broadly defines the receipt of
"valuable consideration" by a person as "any acceptance of any
agreement, promise or offer to give and of any holding out of any
expectation of valuable consideration" (emphasis added). The term
"valuable consideration" is broadly defined to include, among other
things, "money."
Therefore, it would appear evident that the acceptance by an
arranger of arranger fees in the form of money would constitute valuable
consideration for the purposes of section 175(1) of the Crimes Act. This
position remains unaffected notwithstanding that it may be customary in
any relevant trade or calling that valuable consideration be paid to the
arranger. 85 For example, even though it is industry practice that an
arranger be paid arranger fees by the borrower, a fact of which the
participant banks would be aware, an arranger cannot rely upon this
custom as a valid defense in respect to its receipt of valuable
consideration.
(d) A "Reward for Doing Any Act in Relation to His Principal's
Affairs or Business"
Section 176(1)(a) of the Crimes Act requires, as is relevant to this
article, that the secret commission in issue be received by the agent "as
an inducement or reward for or otherwise on account of doing.., or
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 883 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., R v. Gallagher (1987) 29 A. Crim. R. 33.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Babcock & Wilcox Ltd. (1929) 43 C.L.R. 163, 173-74.
Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) § 186(1).

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1

having done.. . any act in relation to his principal's affairs or business."
The term "principal" is defined in section 175(1) of the Crimes Act as
including "a corporation or other person for or on behalf of whom the
agent acts, has acted, or is desirous or intending to act." The meaning of
"for or on behalf of' becomes important in determining whether or not
the participant banks are severally the arranger's principal. This phrase
was considered by the High Court of Australia in re Ross ex parte A-G
for the Northern Territory,'s6 where the Court stated that:
the phrase "on behalf of' is as Latham CJ observed in R v. Portus ex
parte FederalClerks Union ofAustralia (1949) 79 C.L.R. 428 at 435

"not an expression that has a strict legal meaning," it bears no single
and constant significance. Instead it may be used in conjunction with
a wide range of relationships, all however in some way concerned
with the standing of one18person as auxiliary to or a representative of
another person or thing. 7

Therefore, in the context of the receipt of arranger fees by an arranger, a
court must determine whether or not:
1. The arranger has the requisite connection with the
participant banks so as to constitute a relationship under the
Crimes Act that will result in criminal liability; and
2. The acts undertaken by the arranger in connection with its
procurement of arranger fees, such as the solicitation of
funding commitments from the participant banks, were
made in relation to the affairs or business of the participants
banks.
On the assumption that an arranger is the agent of the participant
banks for the purposes of the Crimes Act, two contrary arguments can be
raised in respect to whether or not the arranger fees received by the
arranger constitute a reward from the borrower for arranging the
syndicated loan (being the relevant task undertaken in relation to the
participant banks' affairs or business):
1. Depending upon the nature of business ordinarily
undertaken by the participant bank in question, it may be
arguable, on a broad construction, that the business of
arranging syndicated loans also constitutes the business of
the relevant participant bank; or conversely
2. It may be arguable that a court should take into account the
fact that at the time the arranger performed the relevant
"act" for the purposes of the Crimes Act, being the

186.
187.

Re Ross ex parte A-G for Northern Territory (1980) 54 A.L.J.R. 145.
Id. at 149.
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solicitation of funding commitments from the participant
banks, none of the participant banks had a mandate from the
borrower to perform this function, and thus, on a narrow
construction, the relevant "act" did not constitute or form
part of the participant banks' affairs or business.
Unfortunately, the merits of these arguments have not been tested by an
Australian court and remain subject to a factual determination on a case
by case basis.
3. Possible Application of Secret Commissions Legislation to
Arrangers of Syndicated Loans
The possible application of secret commissions legislation to the
receipt by an arranger of arranger fees from a borrower under a
syndicated loan has caused great concern to a number of
commentators. 88 The possible impost of Australian secret commissions
legislation to the receipt of arranger fees gives rise to two primary
concerns.
First, there is a concern that the language of the relevant secret
commissions legislation is sufficiently board to characterize an arranger
as agent of the participant banks under a syndicated loan and, therefore,
render any arranger fees received by the arranger as an unlawful secret
commission. It would appear upon a literal interpretation of section
176(1) of the Crimes Act, as analyzed in Part V(C)(2) above, that this
concern may primafacie be justified.
Second, as a corollary to the first concern, arranger fees held to be a
secret commission by a court will not only result in an arranger having to
account for such fees in favor of the participant banks, but will result in
the arranger sustaining criminal liability.' 89 It is possible for an arranger
to mitigate against any prospective criminal liability by obtaining the
fully informed consent of the participant banks.' 90 However, this
eventuality is likely to be commercially unrealistic because an arranger
will be loath to disclose in any way to the participant banks the full
amount and details of its arranger fees. 19 1
As a matter of procedure, it is important to note that where it has
been "proved that any valuable consideration has been receive[d] ...by
the agent from ... any person having business relations with the
188.

See, e.g., Bostock, supra note 78, at 44-7; O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 181.

189. The pecuniary penalty for a corporation guilty of an offense under section 176 of
the Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) is 1,200 penalty units (equivalent to A$122,700). See
Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) § 176.
190. See supra Part IV(B)(2)(b).
191. See infra Part V(B) for a discussion on the disclosure defense to the receipt of a
secret commission by an arranger.
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principal without the assent of the principal" the agent has the burden 192
of
proving that the receipt of the relevant commission was not unlawful.
This rule not only modifies the general law position which requires the
Crown to prove every element of an offense, but it absolves the Crown
from its burden to prove that the accused had the requisite mens rea
193
provided that the other necessary indicia of the offense are proven.
Therefore, an arranger which is the subject of a prosecution under section
176(1) of the Crimes Act will have the burden of proving that its receipt
of arranger fees was not unlawful.
While a court's analysis will vary on a case by case basis, it is
submitted that the better view is that the procurement and receipt of
arranger fees by an arranger under a syndicated loan should not, in
ordinary circumstances, be considered as a proscribed secret commission
under Australian secret commissions legislation for at least the following
reasons:
a) the arranger should not be characterized as the agent of
the participant banks for the purposes of Australian
secret commissions legislation because either:
(i) the terms, whether express or implied, of the
mandate letter or term sheet, as the case may be,
should be broad enough to create an agency
relationship between the borrower and the arranger
and not as between the arranger and the participant
banks; or
(ii) the conduct of the arranger when procuring the
funding commitments from the syndicate should
otherwise indicate that the arranger is acting as
agent for the borrower and not the participant
banks; and
b) the arranger's mandate by the borrower to solicit
funding commitments from the participant banks is an
isolated business transaction that should not constitute
or otherwise form part of the participant banks' affairs
or business generally. In other words, on a narrow
construction, it is not the affairs or business of the
participant banks to procure the borrower's mandate in
issue because this mandate has already been conferred
upon the arranger.
192. Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) § 186(2).
193. The rationale for this rule was expressed in R v. Jamieson (1988) V.R. 879,
where Young CJ stated "it was seen as fair to require an agent who received a payment to
satisfy the jury that he received it with an honest purpose as to require a person found in
possession of stolen property to prove that he had come by it honestly."
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In conclusion, given that these questions have not been tested by an
Australian court, it is not entirely clear as to whether or not the receipt of
arranger fees by an arranger, in circumstances where such fees are not
fully disclosed to the participant banks, will amount to the solicitation or
receipt of an unlawful secret commission. Therefore, to the extent that it
is commercially palatable, a prudent arranger should appropriately
document the relevant relationships and adequately disclose its receipt of
arranger fees to the
participant banks so as to mitigate any prospective
94
criminal liability.

V.

Mitigating the Risk of a Fiduciary Relationship and the Duty to
Account for Arranger Fees

While this article contends that an arranger should not, in ordinary
circumstances, be characterized as a fiduciary of the participant banks
under a syndicated loan,' 95 the risk that an Australian court, being largely
representative of other common law jurisdictions, will not consider an
arranger to be the fiduciary of the participant banks under a syndicated
loan cannot altogether be ruled out. Therefore, to the extent that it is
commercially acceptable, a prudent arranger should endeavor to mitigate
the risk of an adverse characterization that the arranger is a fiduciary of
the participant banks specifically or potential legal exposure to account
for any arranger fees it may receive from the borrower in favor of the
participant banks generally. This part examines certain commercial
techniques that may be available to an arranger in order for it achieve
these goals.
A.

Exclusion Clauses

A prudent arranger may mitigate the risk of an adverse construction
that the arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks through the
utilization of an appropriate contractual disclaimer. 196 Halsbury's Laws
of Australia states the general principal of Australian law in relation to
the contractual exclusion or modification of fiduciary obligations as
follows.
194. See infra Part V.
195. See supra Part III(C).
196. For example, the standard loan documentation of the Asia-Pacific Loan Market
Association provides for the following contractual disclaimer:
No Fiduciary Duties: (a) Nothing in this Agreement constitutes the Agent or the
Arranger as a trustee or fiduciary of any other person. (b) Neither the Agent
nor the Arranger shall be bound to account to any Lender for any sum or the
profit element of any sum received by it for its own account.
Asia-Pacific Loan Market Association at http://www.aplma.com (last visited May 30,
2005).
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Where the fiduciary duties arise in whole or in part from a
contract... the instrument which is the source of fiduciary obligation
may relieve a fiduciary from liability for what would otherwise be a
breach of duty or provide a mechanism whereby the fiduciary may
satisfy the requirements of informed consent in some pre-agreed
way. 197
Under Australian law, the efficacy of an arranger's reliance upon an
exclusion clause would appear to be consistent with the obiter dicta of
Mason J in Hospital Products where he said that the "fiduciary
relationship must accommodate itself to the terms of the contract so that
it is consistent with and conforms to them," and that "a fiduciary
relationship cannot be superimposed on the contract in such a way as to
alter the operation which the
contract was intended to have according to
'' 98
construction.
true
its own
Therefore, subject to ordinary contractual principles, provided that
an arranger can demonstrate that at the time of acceptance of the
exclusion clause the relevant participant bank had sufficient knowledge
of the existence and scope of the exclusion clause and otherwise
accepted it on the basis of informed consent, the arranger may prima
facie rely upon the disclaimer or waiver of liability conferred thereunder,
subject to the following qualifications:' 99
a) an exclusion clause will be interpreted contra
proferentem by a court against the person seeking to
rely upon it, such as the arranger. 200 However, unlike
the Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977 (U.K.), Australia
does not have any equivalent legislation granting relief
in favor of a corporation, such as a participant bank,
clause on
that allows a court to read down an exclusion
20 1
the grounds that it is harsh or unjust;
197. LexisNexis Butterworths OnLine, Halsbury's Laws of Australia, [185-804],
available at www.Lexisnexis.com/au. See also, e.g., Queensl. Mines Ltd. v. Hudson
(1978) 18 A.L.R. 1.
198. Hosp. Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 58 A.L.J.R. 587, 609. See also
Queensl. Mines Ltd. 18 A.L.R 1.
199. But see GLOVER, supra note 27, at 3.30 (cautions that "courts would be slow to
give [exclusion clauses] the effect that a fiduciary might intend for them" and "[d]rafting
an [exclusion clause] to cover more than the simplest breaches of fiduciary duty would be
difficult").
200. See, e.g., Joseph Travers & Sons Ltd. v. Cooper, [1915] 1 K.B. 73; Darling
Future Ltd. v. Delco Austl. Pty Ltd. (1986) 161 C.L.R. 500.
201.

The Contracts Review Act, 1980 (N.S.W.) is similar in operation to that of the

Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1997 (U.K.) but does not grant relief in favor of a
corporation, such as a participant bank. See Bhattacharyya, supra note 63, at 261-62, for
a discussion of the efficacy of an exclusion clause under the Unfair Contract Terms Act,
1977 (U.K.) to exclude an arranger's liability for negligence under an information
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b) not all fiduciary obligations are capable of exclusion
by agreement, such as in the case of fraud 20 2 or
possibly negligence.20 3 For example, the Supreme
Court of Victoria in Natwest refused to give effect to
an exclusion clause for the benefit of the arranger in
the case of negligence under an information
memorandum. The Supreme Court of Victoria in
Natwest stated that "the fact that the information
memorandum contained ... a disclaimer ... does not,
to my mind, create a circumstance that would
otherwise prevent [the arranger] being under a duty to
disclose the existence of the subject guarantees or limit
that duty in some way. 20 4 Similarly, the High Court
of England and Wales in Sumitomo held that, despite
the existence of an exclusion clause, an arranger had
assumed responsibility for making certain disclosures
under mortgage indemnity guarantee insurance
policies obtained for the benefit of the participant
banks in its capacity as arranger and that its failure to
make such disclosures constituted a breach of its duty
of care owed to the participant banks which could not
be excluded under the terms of the exclusion clause
relating to its capacity as agent bank. Of relevance,
the Sumitomo Court stated that "[t]he [exclusion
clause] looks to the future role of the agent, not to the
past relationship of the parties;' '20 5 (such as its former
capacity as arranger); and
c) certain liability arising under statute, such as
misleading or deceptive conduct under section 52 of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Austl.) 20 6 or criminal
conduct under Australian secret commissions
legislation.2 °7
While in a different context to the receipt by an arranger of arranger
memorandum.
202. See, e.g., Boyd & Forrest v. Glasgow & S. W. Ry. Co. [1915] S.C. 20, 35-6.
203. See, e.g., Natwest Austl. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd. (Unreported,
Supreme Court of Victoria, McDonald J, July 26, 1993). But see Re City Equitable Fire
Ins. Co. Ltd. [1925] Ch. 407.
204. Natwest Austi. Bank Ltd. v. Tricontinental Corp. Ltd. (Unreported, Supreme
Court of Victoria, McDonald J, July 26, 1993) at 82.
205. Sumitomo Bank Ltd. v. Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA, [19971 1 Lloyd's Rep.
487,493.
206. Provides for a similar cause of action to that of common law negligence.
207. See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1958 (Vict.) § 176.
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fees, common law and United States courts have upheld the efficacy of
exclusion clauses that purport to exclude fiduciary obligations under a
syndicated loan transaction. For example, in NZI Securities Ltd. v. Unity
Group Ltd.,20 8 the High Court of New Zealand held that the fiduciary
obligations created under the transaction documents to a syndicated loan
were capable of contractual modification and confinement. In another
case, UniCredito Italiano SPA v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,20 9 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
agent bank was entitled to rely upon the exclusion clause under the
transaction documents, which excluded it from liability arising from a
failure by the agent bank to disclose certain information to the participant
banks.2 1°
In conclusion, while not free from doubt, it is arguable that an
arranger may contractually exclude its fiduciary obligations with respect
to its receipt of arranger fees provided that it appropriately obtains the
informed consent and acceptance of the terms of the relevant exclusion
from each participant bank. An arranger may obtain the requisite
consent and acceptance from each participant bank by inserting a suitable
contractual provision into the term sheet or the mandate letter to which
the other participant banks are a party.2 '
B. DisclosureDefense
It may also be possible for a prudent arranger to mitigate its legal
exposure, whether arising in equity or under Australian secret
commissions legislation, to account for any arranger fees in favor of the
participant bank by making an appropriate disclosure to the participant
banks of its receipt of arranger fees.
As a general principle, the equitable and statutory proscription
against an agent's receipt of unauthorized profits or secret
commissions 212 can be negated provided that the agent obtained the
benefit of the commission with the fully informed consent of its
principal. This rule was clearly articulated by Lord Hodson in the
seminal case Boardman v. Phipps.213
Nothing short of fully informed consent which the learned judge
208. NZI Sec. Ltd. v. Unity Group Ltd. (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand,
Wylie J, Feb. 11, 1992).
209. UniCredito Italiano SPA v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 288 F. Supp. 2d 485
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
210.

See, e.g., B. Taylor, FiduciaryDuties of Security Trustees andAgents, 20 AUSTL.
&FIN. L. BULL. 2, 22-3 (2004).
See Re Ross ex parte A-G for Northern Territory (1980) 54 A.L.J.R. 145.
See supraPart IV.
Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
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211.
212.
213.
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found not to have been obtained could enable the appellants in the
position which they occupied having taken the 21
opportunity provided

by that position to make a profit for themselves.

The rationale for this rule is that once a principal has full knowledge
of the receipt by its agent of a relevant commission, the principal will
subsequently act with knowledge of that commission's possible influence
upon its agent. Accordingly, in these circumstances, a principal is
afforded the opportunity to, among other things, instruct its agent to
cease dealing with the payer of the commission or to seek independent
advice on the matter in issue.21 5

Under current Australian and English law, the strict disclosure
obligations of a fiduciary are considered "proscriptive" and not
"prescriptive" in nature.21 6 In Breen v. Williams, Gaudron and McHugh

JJ stated "the law of [Australia] does not... impose positive legal duties
on the fiduciary to act in the interests of the person to who the duty is
owed."'2 17 These sentiments were also expressed by Woolf MR in
Attorney-General v. Blake, who said "[fiduciary obligations] tells the
fiduciary what he must not do.
2 18

It does not tell him what he ought to

do."

Accordingly, while Australian courts have denied the imposition of
prescriptive duties via the fiduciary principle on the basis that to do so
would cause equity to encroach upon the domain of contract and tort law,
it is suggested that the duty is in practice an adjunct to the prescriptive
rule couched in negative terms. For example, in Fitzwood Pty. Ltd. v.
Unique Goal Pty. Ltd. (in liq), Finkelstein J expressed the position as
follows:
[that which is often regarded as a fiduciary obligation of disclosure
should not be seen as a positive duty resting on a fiduciary, but a
means by which the fiduciary obtains the release or forgiveness of a

negative duty; such as the duty2to
avoid a conflict of interest, or the
19
duty not to make a secret profit.
An agent may avail itself of the disclosure defense by satisfying two
214. Id. at 109.
215. See, e.g., DAL PONT, supra note 133, at 12.7.
216. See, e.g., Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 C.L.R. 71; Attomey-Gen. v. Blake,
[1998] Ch 439. See also generally A. Abadee, A Fiduciary'sObligation to Disclose in a
Commercial Setting, 29 AusTL. Bus. L. REv. 32 (2001); T. Cockburn, Fiduciary
Disclosure Obligations in Contracting, 26 QUEENSL. L. Soc'Y J. 511 (1996); Carlin,
supra note 23.
217. Breen v. Williams (1996) 186 C.L.R. 71, 113.
218. Attomey-Gen. v. Blake, [1998] Ch. 439, 455.
219. Fitzwood Pty. Ltd. v. Unique Goal Pty. Ltd. (in liq) (2001) 188 A.L.R. 566m
576.
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inclusive indicia.
First, the agent must make disclosure of the
commission to its fiduciary. Second, the agent must make an adequate
disclose of the particulars of the commission to its fiduciary. This part
examines the application of each of these indicia in respect to the receipt
of arranger fees by an arranger under a syndicated loan.
1.

To Whom Should Disclosure Be Made?

Disclosure must be made by the agent to the person or entity to
whom it owes fiduciary duties.22 ° Where the fiduciary is a corporation,
such as in the case of most, if not all, participant banks, there is
conjecture as to whom may validly receive notice of the disclosure on
behalf of the corporation.2 2 1 However, it is submitted that should an
arranger make a disclosure to an appropriate senior officer of the
participant bank, such as an "Executive Director" or "Vice-President,"
that disclosure should be sufficient to have been deemed to have been
made upon the participant bank corporation.
2.

What Should Be Disclosed?

As a general principle, in order for an agent to satisfy its obligation
of, among other things, loyalty,222 the agent must make a "full and frank
disclosure of all material facts" in connection with its receipt of a
commission on behalf of its principal.223 However, an agent is only
required to disclose to its principal all relevant and material facts to the
agent's knowledge
and is not otherwise required to make further prudent
224
inquiries.
Despite the requirement of strict disclosure by an agent, the nature
and extent of such disclosure will often depend upon the individual
circumstances of the case. As a consequence, common law courts have
had difficulty applying a base standard of disclosure when asked to
consider the adequacy of disclosure to a fiduciary in a particular case.
In Grantwell Pty Ltd. v. Franks (hereinafter Grantwell)225 the Full
Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia applied a strict approach
to certain failed disclosures of a real estate agent pertaining to the value
and sale of certain properties. The Court held that even though the agent
220. See, e.g., DPC Estates Pty Ltd. v. Grey & Consul Dev. Pty Ltd. (1974) 1
N.S.W.L.R. 443, 466.
221. See generally GLOVER, supra note 27, at 5.110, in an analogous discussion of a
corporate officer's ratification of a breach of fiduciary duties on behalf of its corporation.
222. See generally DAL PONT & CHALMERS, supra note 3, at 4.10.
223. See, e.g., Anglo-African Merchs. Ltd. v. Bayley, [1970] 1 Q.B. 311, 322. See
generally GLOVER, supra note 27, at 5.131.
224. See, e.g., BLB Corp. of Austi. Est v. Jacobsen (1974) 48 A.L.J.R. 372, 378.
225. Grantwell Pty Ltd. v. Franks (1993) S.A. St. R. 390.
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had disclosed to his principals that the properties in.
issue were indirectly
owned by him via two corporations, the agent was in breach of his
fiduciary duties because he had specifically omitted to disclose the fact
that "the [sale] price was greatly in excess of the price paid by the
[agent's corporations] the year before [to acquire the properties]" and
that "persistent efforts to sell2 26[by the agent's corporations] at the [sale]
price had been unsuccessful.
In another case, BLB Corporation of Australia Est v. Jacobsen
(hereinafter BLB),227 the High Court of Australia took a less prescriptive
approach in its determination of the degree of disclosure required by an
agent to its principal. The Court concluded that even though the agent
had failed to specifically disclose his ninety percent shareholding interest
in a customer of his principal, which customer subsequently became
insolvent, the facts indicated that the principal had at all times a
"comprehensive picture" of the agent's interest in that customer.
Therefore, the Court held that the disclosure made by the agent was
sufficient to satisfy his fiduciary duties owed to the principal and that the
principal had impliedly consented to the disclosure.22 8
In a further case, Advanced Realty Funding Corp. v. Bannink
(hereinafter Advanced Realty),229 the Ontario Court of Appeal considered
the degree of disclosure required by a mortgage broker engaged by a
prospective borrower in respect to its receipt of a "finder's fee," a
situation perhaps analogous to that of the receipt of arranger fees by an
arranger. Of relevance to this article, the Court made the following
finding:
This judgment does not mean that a mortgage broker is never entitled
to collect a finder's fee. It does mean that it is not sufficient to bury a
reference to a finder's fee in a rather ambiguous sentence in the midst
of its contract for fees and commission. If a broker expects or intends
to receive a finder's fee, he has a positive obligation to explain this to
his client, indicate the amount of it or how it is to be calculated (if
this is then known), make sure that his client understands, and receive
230
express consent to the broker receiving the fee ....
Upon a strict interpretation, the holding in Advanced Realty suggests that
if an agent is entitled to receive a fee from a third party in connection
with its dealings with that third party as agent of the principal, in addition
to any fees the agent may be entitled to receive from its principal, the
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 398.
BLB Corp. ofAustl., 48 A.L.J.R. 372.
Id. at 376.
Advanced Realty Funding Corp. v. Bannink [1979] 109 D.L.R.3d 137.
Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
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agent has a positive duty to the principal to disclose the existence and
effect of its entitlement to those fees. The rationale for the Court's
interpretation would appear to be based on the proposition that a
principal should have a reasonable expectation that its agent will act on
its behalf independently and free from any factor that may impinge upon
its loyalty to the principal, such as in respect of any commission.
Dal Pont has cautioned against a strict application of the reasoning
in Advanced Realty for policy reasons stating that:
[T]he Advanced Realty case should not be read as requiring an agent,
in every case in which the contract between the agent and principal
contains a clause entitling the agent to benefits exceeding the agent's
remuneration, to specifically bring this to the principal's attention and
explain its effect. The relative position of the parties. .. coupled
with any applicable industry practice, may make it reasonable to cast
the duty to read carefully and understand the agency
on the principal
2 31
contract.

As discussed earlier, the approach opined by Dal Pont is consistent with
current Australian law.232 Accordingly, an Australian court would not
adopt the strict reasoning advanced in Advanced Realty by way of
importing a positive fiduciary duty upon an agent to make certain
disclosures to its principal, such as an arranger's positive disclosure of its
receipt of arranger fees to the participant banks under a syndicated loan.
However, while a fiduciary does not have a positive duty to disclose any
conflict of interest or unauthorized profit arising in connection with a
fiduciary relationship, a fiduciary must, in order for it to comply with its
duties, seek the forgiveness of its principal for its indiscretions by
effecting the requisite degree of disclosure of such indiscretions to its
principal.
As illustrated by the different approaches taken by the Grantwell
and BLB Courts to the question of adequate disclosure, it is decidedly
difficult to reconcile the often conflicting standards of disclosure
required by Australian courts. In the context of the receipt of arranger
fees by an arranger, it is submitted that, whilst not free from doubt, a
prudent arranger may avail itself of the disclosure defense provided that
it sufficiently discloses to the participant banks the fact that it "may" or
"will" receive an arranger fee from the borrower in relation to its
performance of its duties as arranger under a syndicated loan without the
need to specify the specific quantum of the arranger fees in question, for
at least the following reasons:
a) as it is industry custom for an arranger to receive
231.
232.

DAL PoNT, supra note 133, at 12.9.
See supra note 216.
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an arranger fee from the borrower in
consideration of its arrangement of the syndicated
loan, participant banks are likely to already have
prior knowledge that such fees will be paid under
the syndicated loan;
b) it is arguable that disclosure of the specific
quantum of the arranger fee would not serve any
real purpose other than to give the participant
banks a competitive advantage in the syndicated
loan marketplace (on the assumption that the
participant banks also undertake the business of
arranging loans). Disclosure of the fact that an
arranger "may" or "will" receive an arranger fee
should give sufficient opportunity to the
participant bank to counteract any possible
adverse influence that the arranger fee may have
upon the loyalty of the arranger;
c) Lehane, while acknowledging the strict traditional
rule of disclosure, suggests that participant banks
need not know the specific amount of any
arranger
fees
unless
such
fees
were
extraordinary; 233 and
d) the specific quantum of arranger fees are highly
confidential and sensitive information, a fact
exacerbated by reason that most participant banks
are in direct competition with the arranger with
respect to securing future mandates from
syndicated loan market participants. Therefore, if
an arranger were required to disclosure the
specific quantum of arranger fees to participant
banks, this may have an adverse impact upon,
among other things, competition in the
marketplace.
In addition, the approach not to disclose the specific quantum of
arranger fees to the participant banks is commercially sensible given the
fact that it is not likely that an Australian court would, in ordinary
circumstances, construe an arranger to be a fiduciary of the participant
banks.234
In conclusion, an arranger may effect the requisite disclosure by
233. Lehane, supra note 77, at 237. See also O'Sullivan, supra note 8, at 180
(supports the views of Lehane).
234. See the submission made in Part III(C) supra.
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inserting a suitable contractual provision specifying the fact that it may
or will receive arranger fees into the mandate letter or the term sheet, as
the case may be. However, as it is not possible to synthesize a specific
principle as to the standard of disclosure as applied by the Australian
courts, to put the issue beyond doubt, whilst acknowledging this
approach to be commercially unpalatable, is to make a complete
disclosure of the receipt and quantum of arranger fees to the participant
banks under a syndicated loan.
VI. Conclusion
Many commentators 235 have strenuously denied that an arranger
assumes fiduciary duties in favor of participant banks in the performance
of their role under a syndicated loan. However, the risk that an
Australian court, being largely representative of other common law
jurisdictions, will not consider an arranger to be the fiduciary of the
participant banks under a syndicated loan cannot altogether be ruled
2 36
out.
As Tennekoon cautions:
Some writers 237 have taken the view that fiduciary duties.., will not
be imposed on [an arranger] for the benefit of [participant banks] in a
syndicate in respect of the negotiation of loan documentation. It is
submitted that the risk that 238
a court will impose fiduciary duties
cannot altogether be ruled out.
Nevertheless, on balance, the risk of an adverse characterization that an
arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks is minimal for at least two
reasons.
First, despite a trend of increased jurisprudential encroachment into
the domain of modem day commerce, 239 common law courts are likely to
be cautious when deliberating whether or not to import fiduciary status
between an arranger and the participant banks under a syndicated loan.
240
The sentiments of this view was supported in Hodgkinson v. Simms
where the Supreme Court of Canada stated in obiter dicta that
"[c]ommercial interactions between parties at arm's length normally
derive their social utility from the pursuit of self-interest, and the courts
are rightly circumspect when asked to enforce a [fiduciary] duty that

235.
236.

See, e.g., O'Sullivan, supra note 8; Clarke, supra note 47.
See, e.g., R. TENNEKOON, THE LAW AND REGULATION
FINANCE 56 (1991).
237. Such as, e.g., Clarke, supra note 47, at 234.
238. TENNEKOON, supra note 2362, at 56.
239. See supra Part III(A).
240. Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377.
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vindicates the very antithesis of self-interest. 1
Second, as a matter of commercial practice, a prudent arranger is
capable of mitigating the risk of an adverse construction made by a court
that the arranger is a fiduciary of the participant banks by way of an
appropriate contractual disclaimer or by disclosing to the participant
banks its intended receipt, and possibly quantum, of arranger fees.24 2
However, while this article submits that an arranger should not
ordinarily be subject to prospective criminal liability under Australian
secret commissions legislation, or other comparative legislation of
common law jurisdictions, this issue remains untested by Australian
courts and may be of concern to arrangers of syndicated loans.243
In conclusion, while the existence of a fiduciary relationship
between an arranger and the participant banks cannot be categorically
denied in all circumstances, it is this author's view that in the absence of
any special or unique factual circumstances serving to create any undue
reliance or vulnerability on the part of a participant bank, it is unlikely
that an Australian or common law court would be inclined to invoke a
fiduciary relationship between an arranger and participant banks under a
syndicated loan.244 Therefore, absent any possible application of
Australian secret commissions legislation or other comparative
legislation of common law jurisdictions, it is unlikely that an arranger
will be required by a common law court to disgorge and account for any
arranger fees received by it in favor of the participant banks under a
syndicated loan.

241. Id.at 414.
242. See supra Part V.
243. See supra Part IV(B).
244. This will especially be the case in circumstances where: (a) the arranger uses an
appropriate exclusion clause; and/or (b) the nature of a claim by a participant bank is
narrowed to issues relating to the recovery of fees paid to an arranger and not to issues
surrounding the arranger unfairly inducing the participant bank to participate in the
syndicated loan, although sometimes these issues may be inextricably linked.

